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The principle of minimal differentiation, based on the Hotelling model, is well known in the economy. It is applicable to horizontal differentiated goods of almost any nature. The Hotelling approach to modeling competition of oligopolies corresponds to a modern description of monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. We develop a modification of the Hotelling model that endows a firm with a non-market advantage, which is introduced alike the valence advantage known in problems of political economy. The nonmarket (valence) advantage can be interpreted as advertisement (brand awareness of firms). Problem statement. Consider two firms competing with prices and location. Homogeneous consumers vary with its location on a segment. They minimize their costs, which additively includes the price of the product and the distance from them to the product. The utility function is linear with respect to the price and quadratic with respect to the distance. It is also expected that one of the firms (for certainty, firm № 1) has a market advantage d. The consumers are assumed to take into account the sum of the distance to the product and the market advantage of firm 1. Thus, the strategy of the firms and the consumers depend on two parameters: the unit t of the transport costs and the non-market advantage d. I explore characteristics of the equilibrium in the model as a function of the non-market advantage for different fixed t. The aim of the research is to assess the impact of the non-market advantage on the equlibrium. We prove that the Nash equilibrium exists and it is unique under additive consumers' preferences de-pending on the square of the distance between consumers and firms. This equilibrium is ‘richer’ than that in the original Hotelling model. In particular, non-market advantage can be excessive and inefficient to use.

The author presents a new macroeconomic model designed to analyze and forecast technology diffusion processes in markets characterized by bounded capacity. The study addresses the major limitations of classical phenomenological models, such as the Bass and Gompertz frameworks, which suffer from a rigidly fixed trajectory asymmetry and lack explicit microeconomic foundations. To overcome these constraints, we employ an interdisciplinary approach that transfers the ecological concept of limited resource rationing from the Arditi–Ginzburg–Contois model into operations management theory. This framework integrates the Karmarkar clearing function with the Leontief–Liebig production function to establish a rigorous dynamic balance. By applying this integration, the author analytically derives an alternative technological innovation diffusion law that expresses time as an explicit function of the cumulative market volume. To identify parameters from empirical data, the study develops a robust numerical grid inversion algorithm that utilizes vector linear interpolation within the MATLAB computing environment. This approach avoids iterative root-finding errors and ensures high computational stability for the non-linear least squares optimization procedure. We test the empirical validity of the developed diffusion law using two distinct historical macroeconomic cases: the quarterly cumulative sales of the Apple iPod and the annual subscription data for the mobile broadband market in Germany. The resulting statistical metrics demonstrate that the proposed model provides superior approximation quality and mathematical advantages on high-tech market data due to its highly flexible asymmetry parameter. The fundamental scientific novelty of this research lies in the theoretical justification of the macroeconomic S-curve through the internal balance equations of an open chemostat-type system operating under a competitive vacuum. The proposed mathematical apparatus offers a practical tool for corporate management and regulatory agencies to plan market capacity and accurately forecast peak technological substitution rates.