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Theoretical modeling consensus building in the work of standardization technical committees in coalitions based on regular Markov chains
Often decisions in social groups are made by consensus. This applies, for example, to the examination in the technical committee for standardization (TC) before the approval of the national standard by Rosstandart. The standard is approved if and only if the secured consensus in the TC. The same approach to standards development was adopted in almost all countries and at the regional and international level. Previously published works of authors dedicated to the construction of a mathematical model of time to reach consensus in technical committees for standardization in terms of variation in the number of TC members and their level of authoritarianism. The present study is a continuation of these works for the case of the formation of coalitions that are often formed during the consideration of the draft standard to the TC. In the article the mathematical model is constructed to ensure consensus on the work of technical standardization committees in terms of coalitions. In the framework of the model it is shown that in the presence of coalitions consensus is not achievable. However, the coalition, as a rule, are overcome during the negotiation process, otherwise the number of the adopted standards would be extremely small. This paper analyzes the factors that influence the bridging coalitions: the value of the assignment and an index of the effect of the coalition. On the basis of statistical modelling of regular Markov chains is investigated their effects on the time to ensure consensus in the technical Committee. It is proved that the time to reach consensus significantly depends on the value of unilateral concessions coalition and weakly depends on the size of coalitions. Built regression model of dependence of the average number of approvals from the value of the assignment. It was revealed that even a small concession leads to the onset of consensus, increasing the size of the assignment results (with other factors being equal) to a sharp decline in time before the consensus. It is shown that the assignment of a larger coalition against small coalitions takes on average more time before consensus. The result has practical value for all organizational structures, where the emergence of coalitions entails the inability of decision-making in the framework of consensus and requires the consideration of various methods for reaching a consensus decision.
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International Interdisciplinary Conference "Mathematics. Computing. Education"