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Iterative decomposition methods in modelling the development of oligopolistic markets
pdf (348K)
One of the principles of forming a competitive market environment is to create conditions for economic agents to implement Nash – Cournot optimal strategies. With the standard approach to determining Nash – Cournot optimal market strategies, economic agents must have complete information about the indicators and dynamic characteristics of all market participants. Which is not true.
In this regard, to find Nash – Cournot optimal solutions in dynamic models, it is necessary to have a coordinator who has complete information about the participants. However, in the case of a large number of game participants, even if the coordinator has the necessary information, computational difficulties arise associated with the need to solve a large number of coupled equations (in the case of linear dynamic games — Riccati matrix equations).
In this regard, there is a need to decompose the general problem of determining optimal strategies for market participants into private (local) problems. Approaches based on the iterative decomposition of coupled matrix Riccati equations and the solution of local Riccati equations were studied for linear dynamic games with a quadratic criterion. This article considers a simpler approach to the iterative determination of the Nash – Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly, by decomposition using operational calculus (operator method).
The proposed approach is based on the following procedure. A virtual coordinator, which has information about the parameters of the inverse demand function, forms prices for the prospective period. Oligopolists, given fixed price dynamics, determine their strategies in accordance with a slightly modified optimality criterion. The optimal volumes of production of the oligopolists are sent to the coordinator, who, based on the iterative algorithm, adjusts the price dynamics at the previous step.
The proposed procedure is illustrated by the example of a static and dynamic model of rational behavior of oligopoly participants who maximize the net present value (NPV). Using the methods of operational calculus (and in particular, the inverse Z-transformation), conditions are found under which the iterative procedure leads to equilibrium levels of price and production volumes in the case of linear dynamic games with both quadratic and nonlinear (concave) optimization criteria.
The approach considered is used in relation to examples of duopoly, triopoly, duopoly on the market with a differentiated product, duopoly with interacting oligopolists with a linear inverse demand function. Comparison of the results of calculating the dynamics of price and production volumes of oligopolists for the considered examples based on coupled equations of the matrix Riccati equations in Matlab (in the table — Riccati), as well as in accordance with the proposed iterative method in the widely available Excel system shows their practical identity.
In addition, the application of the proposed iterative procedure is illustrated by the example of a duopoly with a nonlinear demand function.
Copyright © 2025 Varshavsky L.E.
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