Game-theoretic and reflexive combat models

Korepanov V.O., Chkhartishvili A.G., Shumov V.V.
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Modeling combat operations is an urgent scientific and practical task aimed at providing commanders and staffs with quantitative grounds for making decisions. The authors proposed the function of victory in combat and military operations, based on the function of the conflict by G. Tullock and taking into account the scale of combat (military) operations. On a sufficient volume of military statistics, the scale parameter was assessed and its values were found for the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The game-theoretic models «offensive – defense», in which the sides solve the immediate and subsequent tasks, having the formation of troops in one or several echelons, have been investigated. At the first stage of modeling, the solution of the immediate task is found — the breakthrough (holding) of defense points, at the second — the solution of the subsequent task — the defeat of the enemy in the depth of the defense (counterattack and restoration of defense). For the tactical level, using the Nash equilibrium, solutions were found for the closest problem (distribution of the forces of the sides by points of defense) in an antagonistic game according to three criteria: a) breakthrough of the weakest point, b) breakthrough of at least one point, and c) weighted average probability. It is shown that it is advisable for the attacking side to use the criterion of «breaking through at least one point», in which, all other things being equal, the maximum probability of breaking through the points of defense is ensured. At the second stage of modeling for a particular case (the sides are guided by the criterion of breaking through the weakest point when breaking through and holding defense points), the problem of distributing forces and facilities between tactical tasks (echelons) was solved according to two criteria: a) maximizing the probability of breaking through the defense point and the probability of defeating the enemy in depth defense, b) maximizing the minimum value of the named probabilities (the criterion of the guaranteed result). Awareness is an important aspect of combat operations. Several examples of reflexive games (games characterized by complex mutual awareness) and information management are considered. It is shown under what conditions information control increases the player’s payoff, and the optimal information control is found.

Keywords: mathematical model, battle, offensive, defense, victory function, game-theoretic model, reflexive and information control
Citation in English: Korepanov V.O., Chkhartishvili A.G., Shumov V.V. Game-theoretic and reflexive combat models // Computer Research and Modeling, 2022, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 179-203
Citation in English: Korepanov V.O., Chkhartishvili A.G., Shumov V.V. Game-theoretic and reflexive combat models // Computer Research and Modeling, 2022, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 179-203
DOI: 10.20537/2076-7633-2022-14-1-179-203
URL: http://crm-en.ics.org.ru/journal/article/3168/
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

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