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In this paper construct the mathematical model for consensus in technical committees for standardization (TC), based on the consensus model proposed DeGroot. The basic problems of achieving consensus in the development of consensus standards in terms of the proposed model are discussed. The results of statistical modeling characterizing the dependence of time to reach consensus on the number of members of the TC and their authoritarianism are presented. It has been shown that increasing the number of TC experts and authoritarianism negative impact on the time to reach a consensus and increase fragmentation of the TC.

In many social groups, for example, in technical committees for standardization, at the international, regional and national levels, in European communities, managers of ecovillages, social movements (occupy), international organizations, decision-making is based on the consensus of the group members. Instead of voting, where the majority wins over the minority, consensus allows for a solution that each member of the group supports, or at least considers acceptable. This approach ensures that all group members’ opinions, ideas and needs are taken into account. At the same time, it is noted that reaching consensus takes a long time, since it is necessary to ensure agreement within the group, regardless of its size. It was shown that in some situations the number of iterations (agreements, negotiations) is very significant. Moreover, in the decision-making process, there is always a risk of blocking the decision by the minority in the group, which not only delays the decisionmaking time, but makes it impossible. Typically, such a minority is one or two odious people in the group. At the same time, such a member of the group tries to dominate in the discussion, always remaining in his opinion, ignoring the position of other colleagues. This leads to a delay in the decision-making process, on the one hand, and a deterioration in the quality of consensus, on the other, since only the opinion of the dominant member of the group has to be taken into account. To overcome the crisis in this situation, it was proposed to make a decision on the principle of «consensus minus one» or «consensus minus two», that is, do not take into account the opinion of one or two odious members of the group.

The article, based on modeling consensus using the model of regular Markov chains, examines the question of how much the decision-making time according to the «consensus minus one» rule is reduced, when the position of the dominant member of the group is not taken into account.

The general conclusion that follows from the simulation results is that the rule of thumb for making decisions on the principle of «consensus minus one» has a corresponding mathematical justification. The simulation results showed that the application of the «consensus minus one» rule can reduce the time to reach consensus in the group by 76–95%, which is important for practice.

The average number of agreements hyperbolically depends on the average authoritarianism of the group members (excluding the authoritarian one), which means the possibility of delaying the agreement process at high values of the authoritarianism of the group members.

The theoretical study of consensus makes it possible to analyze the various situations that social groups that make decisions in this way have to face in real life, abstracting from the specific characteristics of the groups. It is relevant for practice to study the dynamics of a social group consisting of loyal experts who, in the process of seeking consensus, yield to each other. In this case, psychological “traps” such as false consensus or groupthink are possible, which can sometimes lead to managerial decisions with dire consequences.

The article builds a mathematical consensus model for a group of loyal experts based on modeling using regular Markov chains. Analysis of the model showed that with an increase in the loyalty (decrease in authoritarianism) of group members, the time to reach consensus increases exponentially (the number of agreements increases), which is apparently due to the lack of desire among experts to take part of the responsibility for the decision being made. An increase in the size of such a group leads (ceteris paribus):

– to reduce the number of approvals to consensus in the conditions of striving for absolute loyalty of members, i. e. each additional loyal member adds less and less “strength” to the group;

– to a logarithmic increase in the number of approvals in the context of an increase in the average authoritarianism of members. It is shown that in a small group (two people), the time for reaching consensus can increase by more than 10 times compared to a group of 5 or more members), in the group there is a transfer of responsibility for making decisions.

It is proved that in the case of a group of two absolutely loyal members, consensus is unattainable.

A reasonable conclusion is made that consensus in a group of loyal experts is a special (special) case of consensus, since the dependence of the time until consensus is reached on the authoritarianism of experts and their number in the group is described by different curves than in the case of a regular group of experts.

Often decisions in social groups are made by consensus. This applies, for example, to the examination in the technical committee for standardization (TC) before the approval of the national standard by Rosstandart. The standard is approved if and only if the secured consensus in the TC. The same approach to standards development was adopted in almost all countries and at the regional and international level. Previously published works of authors dedicated to the construction of a mathematical model of time to reach consensus in technical committees for standardization in terms of variation in the number of TC members and their level of authoritarianism. The present study is a continuation of these works for the case of the formation of coalitions that are often formed during the consideration of the draft standard to the TC. In the article the mathematical model is constructed to ensure consensus on the work of technical standardization committees in terms of coalitions. In the framework of the model it is shown that in the presence of coalitions consensus is not achievable. However, the coalition, as a rule, are overcome during the negotiation process, otherwise the number of the adopted standards would be extremely small. This paper analyzes the factors that influence the bridging coalitions: the value of the assignment and an index of the effect of the coalition. On the basis of statistical modelling of regular Markov chains is investigated their effects on the time to ensure consensus in the technical Committee. It is proved that the time to reach consensus significantly depends on the value of unilateral concessions coalition and weakly depends on the size of coalitions. Built regression model of dependence of the average number of approvals from the value of the assignment. It was revealed that even a small concession leads to the onset of consensus, increasing the size of the assignment results (with other factors being equal) to a sharp decline in time before the consensus. It is shown that the assignment of a larger coalition against small coalitions takes on average more time before consensus. The result has practical value for all organizational structures, where the emergence of coalitions entails the inability of decision-making in the framework of consensus and requires the consideration of various methods for reaching a consensus decision.