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The well-known “Sea battle” game is in the focus of the current job. The main goal of the article is to provide modified version of “Sea battle” game and to find optimal players’ strategies in the new rules. Changes were applied to attacking strategies (new option to attack hitting four cells in one shot was added) as well as to the size of the field (sizes of 10 × 10, 20 × 20, 30 × 30 were used) and to the rules of disposal algorithms during the game (new possibility to move the ship off the attacking zone). The game was solved with the use of game theory capabilities: payoff matrices were found for each version of altered rules, for which optimal pure and mixed strategies were discovered. For solving payoff matrices iterative method was used. The simulation was in applying five attacking algorithms and six disposal ones with parameters variation due to the game of players with each other. Attacking algorithms were varied in 100 sets of parameters, disposal algorithms — in 150 sets. Major result is that using such algorithms the modified “Sea battle” game can be solved — that implies the possibility of finding stable pure and mixed strategies of behaviour, which guarantee the sides gaining optimal results in game theory terms. Moreover, influence of modifying the rules of “Sea battle” game is estimated. Comparison with prior authors’ results on this topic was made. Based on matching the payoff matrices with the statistical analysis, completed earlier, it was found out that standard “Sea battle” game could be represented as a special case of game modifications, observed in this article. The job is important not only because of its applications in war area, but in civil areas as well. Use of article’s results could save resources in exploration, provide an advantage in war conflicts, defend devices under devastating impact.

The course and outcome of the battle is largely dependent on the morale of the troops, characterized by the percentage of loss in killed and wounded, in which the troops still continue to fight. Every fight is a psychological act of ending his rejection of one of the parties. Typically, models of battle psychological factor taken into account in the decision of Lanchester equations (the condition of equality of forces, when the number of one of the parties becomes zero). It is emphasized that the model Lanchester type satisfactorily describe the dynamics of the battle only in the initial stages. To resolve this contradiction is proposed to use a modification of Lanchester's equations, taking into account the fact that at any moment of the battle on the enemy firing not affected and did not abandon the battle fighters. The obtained differential equations are solved by numerical method and allow the dynamics to take into account the influence of psychological factor and evaluate the completion time of the conflict. Computational experiments confirm the known military theory is the fact that the fight usually ends in refusal of soldiers of one of the parties from its continuation (avoidance of combat in various forms). Along with models of temporal and spatial dynamics proposed to use a modification of the technology features of the conflict of S. Skaperdas, based on the principles of combat. To estimate the probability of victory of one side in the battle takes into account the interest of the maturing sides of the bloody casualties and increased military superiority.

Modeling combat operations is an urgent scientific and practical task aimed at providing commanders and staffs with quantitative grounds for making decisions. The authors proposed the function of victory in combat and military operations, based on the function of the conflict by G. Tullock and taking into account the scale of combat (military) operations. On a sufficient volume of military statistics, the scale parameter was assessed and its values were found for the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The game-theoretic models «offensive – defense», in which the sides solve the immediate and subsequent tasks, having the formation of troops in one or several echelons, have been investigated. At the first stage of modeling, the solution of the immediate task is found — the breakthrough (holding) of defense points, at the second — the solution of the subsequent task — the defeat of the enemy in the depth of the defense (counterattack and restoration of defense). For the tactical level, using the Nash equilibrium, solutions were found for the closest problem (distribution of the forces of the sides by points of defense) in an antagonistic game according to three criteria: a) breakthrough of the weakest point, b) breakthrough of at least one point, and c) weighted average probability. It is shown that it is advisable for the attacking side to use the criterion of «breaking through at least one point», in which, all other things being equal, the maximum probability of breaking through the points of defense is ensured. At the second stage of modeling for a particular case (the sides are guided by the criterion of breaking through the weakest point when breaking through and holding defense points), the problem of distributing forces and facilities between tactical tasks (echelons) was solved according to two criteria: a) maximizing the probability of breaking through the defense point and the probability of defeating the enemy in depth defense, b) maximizing the minimum value of the named probabilities (the criterion of the guaranteed result). Awareness is an important aspect of combat operations. Several examples of reflexive games (games characterized by complex mutual awareness) and information management are considered. It is shown under what conditions information control increases the player’s payoff, and the optimal information control is found.

Simulation of combat and military operations is the most important scientific and practical task aimed at providing the command of quantitative bases for decision-making. The first models of combat were developed during the First World War (M. Osipov, F. Lanchester), and now they are widely used in connection with the massive introduction of automation tools. At the same time, the models of combat and war do not fully take into account the moral potentials of the parties to the conflict, which motivates and motivates the further development of models of battle and war. A probabilistic model of combat is considered, in which the parameter of combat superiority is determined through the parameter of moral (the ratio of the percentages of the losses sustained by the parties) and the parameter of technological superiority. To assess the latter, the following is taken into account: command experience (ability to organize coordinated actions), reconnaissance, fire and maneuverability capabilities of the parties and operational (combat) support capabilities. A game-based offensive-defense model has been developed, taking into account the actions of the first and second echelons (reserves) of the parties. The target function of the attackers in the model is the product of the probability of a breakthrough by the first echelon of one of the defense points by the probability of the second echelon of the counterattack repelling the reserve of the defenders. Solved the private task of managing the breakthrough of defense points and found the optimal distribution of combat units between the trains. The share of troops allocated by the parties to the second echelon (reserve) increases with an increase in the value of the aggregate combat superiority parameter of those advancing and decreases with an increase in the value of the combat superiority parameter when repelling a counterattack. When planning a battle (battles, operations) and the distribution of its troops between echelons, it is important to know not the exact number of enemy troops, but their capabilities and capabilities, as well as the degree of preparedness of the defense, which does not contradict the experience of warfare. Depending on the conditions of the situation, the goal of an offensive may be to defeat the enemy, quickly capture an important area in the depth of the enemy’s defense, minimize their losses, etc. For scaling the offensive-defense model for targets, the dependencies of the losses and the onset rate on the initial ratio of the combat potentials of the parties were found. The influence of social costs on the course and outcome of wars is taken into account. A theoretical explanation is given of a loss in a military company with a technologically weak adversary and with a goal of war that is unclear to society. To account for the influence of psychological operations and information wars on the moral potential of individuals, a model of social and information influence was used.