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In various applications, i. e., astronomical imaging, electron microscopy, and tomography, images are often damaged by Poisson noise. At the same time, the thermal motion leads to Gaussian noise. Therefore, in such applications, the image is usually corrupted by mixed Poisson – Gaussian noise.

In this paper, we propose a novel method for recovering images corrupted by mixed Poisson – Gaussian noise. In the proposed method, we develop a total variation-based model connected with the nonconvex function and the total generalized variation regularization, which overcomes the staircase artifacts and maintains neat edges.

Numerically, we employ the primal-dual method combined with the classical iteratively reweighted $l_1$ algorithm to solve our minimization problem. Experimental results are provided to demonstrate the superiority of our proposed model and algorithm for mixed Poisson – Gaussian removal to state-of-the-art numerical methods.

Image denoising is one of the fundamental problems in digital image processing. This problem usually refers to the reconstruction of an image from an observed image degraded by noise. There are many factors that cause this degradation such as transceiver equipment, or environmental influences, etc. In order to obtain higher quality images, many methods have been proposed for image denoising problem. Most image denoising method are based on total variation (TV) regularization to develop efficient algorithms for solving the related optimization problem. TV-based models have become a standard technique in image restoration with the ability to preserve image sharpness.

In this paper, we focus on Poisson noise usually appearing in photon-counting devices. We propose an effective regularization model based on combination of first-order and fractional-order total variation for image reconstruction corrupted by Poisson noise. The proposed model allows us to eliminate noise while edge preserving. An efficient alternating minimization algorithm is employed to solve the optimization problem. Finally, provided numerical results show that our proposed model can preserve more details and get higher image visual quality than recent state-of-the-art methods.

A dynamic game theoretic model of struggle against corruption in resource allocation is considered. It is supposed that the system of resource allocation includes one principal, one or several supervisors, and several agents. The relations between them are hierarchical: the principal influences to the supervisors, and they in turn exert influence on the agents. It is assumed that the supervisor can be corrupted. The agents propose bribes to the supervisor who in exchange allocates additional resources to them. It is also supposed that the principal is not corrupted and does not have her own purposes. The model is investigated from the point of view of the supervisor and the agents. From the point of view of agents a non-cooperative game arises with a set of Nash equilibria as a solution. The set is found analytically on the base of Pontryagin maximum principle for the specific class of model functions. From the point of view of the supervisor a hierarchical Germeyer game of the type Г_2t is built, and the respective algorithm of its solution is proposed. The punishment strategy is found analytically, and the reward strategy is built numerically on the base of a discrete analogue of the initial continuous- time model. It is supposed that all agents can change their strategies in the same time instants only a finite number of times. Thus, the supervisor can maximize his objective function of many variables instead of maximization of the objective functional. A method of qualitatively representative scenarios is used for the solution. The idea of this method consists in that it is possible to choose a very small number of scenarios among all potential ones that represent all qualitatively different trajectories of the system dynamics. These scenarios differ in principle while all other scenarios yield no essentially new results. Then a complete enumeration of the qualitatively representative scenarios becomes possible. After that, the supervisor reports to the agents the rewardpunishment control mechanism.

In this paper we consider a new modification of the discrete version of Mikhailov’s ‘power–society’ model, previously proposed by the author. This modification includes social-economical dynamics and corruption of the system similarly to continuous ‘power–society–economics–corruption’ model but is based on a stochastic cellular automaton describing the dynamics of power distribution in a hierarchy. This new version is founded on previously proposed ‘power–society’ system modeling cellular automaton, its cell state space enriched with variables corresponding to population, economic production, production assets volume and corruption level. The social-economical structure of the model is inherited from Solow and deterministic continuous ‘power–society–economics–corruption’ models. At the same time the new model is flexible, allowing to consider regional differentiation in all social and economical dynamics parameters, to use various production and demography models and to account for goods transit between the regions. A simulation system was built, including three power hierarchy levels, five regions and 100 municipalities. and a number of numerical experiments were carried out. This research yielded results showing specific changes of the dynamics in power distribution in hierarchy when corruption level increases. While corruption is zero (similar to the previous version of the model) the power distribution in hierarchy asymptotically tends to one of stationary states. If the corruption level increases substantially, volume of power in the system is subjected to irregular oscillations, and only much later tends to a stationary value. The meaning of these results can be interpreted as the fact that the stability of power hierarchy decreases when corruption level goes up.

Simulation model of corruption in hierarchical systems which takes into account individual strategies of elements and collective behavior of large groups is proposed. Evolution of various characteristics like level of corruption or ratio of corrupted elements and their dependence on external parameters are discussed. The effectiveness of various anticorruptional strategies is examined by means of numeric analysis.