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In this paper we consider mathematical model to control water quality. We study a system with two-level hierarchy: one environmental organization (supervisor) at the top level and a few industrial enterprises (agents) at the lower level. The main goal of the supervisor is to keep water pollution level below certain value, while enterprises pollute water, as a side effect of the manufacturing process. Supervisor achieves its goal by charging a penalty for enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises choose how much to purify their wastewater to maximize their income.The fee increases the budget of the supervisor. Moreover, effulent fees are charged for the quantity and/or quality of the discharged pollution. Unfortunately, in practice, such charges are ineffective due to the insufficient tax size. The article solves the problem of determining the optimal size of the charge for pollution discharge, which allows maintaining the quality of river water in the rear range.

We describe system members goals with target functionals, and describe water pollution level and enterprises state as system of ordinary differential equations. We consider the problem from both supervisor and enterprises sides. From agents’ point a normal-form game arises, where we search for Nash equilibrium and for the supervisor, we search for Stackelberg equilibrium. We propose numerical algorithms for finding both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. When we construct Nash equilibrium, we solve optimal control problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. We construct Hamilton’s function and solve corresponding system of partial differential equations with shooting method and finite difference method. Numerical calculations show that the low penalty for enterprises results in increasing pollution level, when relatively high penalty can result in enterprises bankruptcy. This leads to the problem of choosing optimal penalty, which requires considering problem from the supervisor point. In that case we use the method of qualitatively representative scenarios for supervisor and Pontryagin’s maximum principle for agents to find optimal control for the system. At last, we compute system consistency ratio and test algorithms for different data. The results show that a hierarchical control is required to provide system stability.

The paper investigates the dynamics of a finite-dimensional model describing the interaction of three populations: prey $x(t)$, its consuming predator $y(t)$, and a superpredator $z(t)$ that feeds on both species. Mathematically, the problem is formulated as a system of nonlinear first-order differential equations with the following right-hand side: $[x(1-x)-(y+z)g;\,\eta_1^{}yg-d_1^{}f-\mu_1^{}y;\,\eta_2^{}zg+d_2^{}f-\mu_2^{}z]$, where $\eta_j^{}$, $d_j^{}$, $\mu_j^{}$ ($j=1,\,2$) are positive coefficients. The considered model belongs to the class of cosymmetric dynamical systems under the Lotka\,--\,Volterra functional response $g=x$, $f=yz$, and two parameter constraints: $\mu_2^{}=d_2^{}\left(1+\frac{\mu_1^{}}{d_1^{}}\right)$, $\eta_2^{}=d_2^{}\left(1+\frac{\eta_1^{}}{d_1^{}}\right)$. In this case, a family of equilibria is being of a straight line in phase space. We have analyzed the stability of the equilibria from the family and isolated equilibria. Maps of stationary solutions and limit cycles have been constructed. The breakdown of the family is studied by violating the cosymmetry conditions and using the Holling model $g(x)=\frac x{1+b_1^{}x}$ and the Beddington–DeAngelis model $f(y,\,z)=\frac{yz}{1+b_2^{}y+b_3^{}z}$. To achieve this, the apparatus of Yudovich's theory of cosymmetry is applied, including the computation of cosymmetric defects and selective functions. Through numerical experimentation, invasive scenarios have been analyzed, encompassing the introduction of a superpredator into the predator-prey system, the elimination of the predator, or the superpredator.

We comsider a model of the dynamics a political system of several parties, accompanied and controlled by the growth of social tension. A system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations is proposed with respect to fractions and an additional scalar variable characterizing the magnitude of tension in society the change of each party is proportional to the current value multiplied by a coefficient that consists of an influx of novice, a flow from competing parties, and a loss due to the growth of social tension. The change in tension is made up of party contributions and own relaxation. The number of parties is fixed, there are no mechanisms in the model for combining existing or the birth of new parties.

To study of possible scenarios of the dynamic processes of the model we derive an approach based on the selection of conditions under which this problem belongs to the class of cosymmetric systems. For the case of two parties, it is shown that in the system under consideration may have two families of equilibria, as well as a family of limit cycles. The existence of cosymmetry for a system of differential equations is ensured by the presence of additional constraints on the parameters, and in this case, the emergence of continuous families of stationary and nonstationary solutions is possible. To analyze the scenarios of cosymmetry breaking, an approach based on the selective function is applied. In the case of one political party, there is no multistability, one stable solution corresponds to each set of parameters. For the case of two parties, it is shown that in the system under consideration may have two families of equilibria, as well as a family of limit cycles. The results of numerical experiments demonstrating the destruction of the families and the implementation of various scenarios leading to the stabilization of the political system with the coexistence of both parties or to the disappearance of one of the parties, when part of the population ceases to support one of the parties and becomes indifferent are presented.

This model can be used to predict the inter-party struggle during the election campaign. In this case necessary to take into account the dependence of the coefficients of the system on time.

Dynamic scenarios leading to multistability in the form of continuous families of stable solutions are studied for a system of autonomous differential equations. The approach is based on determining the cosymmetries of the problem, calculating stationary solutions, and numerically-analytically studying their stability. The analysis is carried out for equations of the Lotka –Volterra type, describing the interaction of two predators feeding on two related prey species. For a system of ordinary differential equations of the 4th order with 11 real parameters, a numerical-analytical study of possible interaction scenarios was carried out. Relationships are found analytically between the control parameters under which the cosymmetry linear in the variables of the problem is realized and families of stationary solutions (equilibria) arise. The case of multicosymmetry is established and explicit formulas for a two-parameter family of equilibria are presented. The analysis of the stability of these solutions made it possible to reveal the division of the family into regions of stable and unstable equilibria. In a computational experiment, the limit cycles branching off from unstable stationary solutions are determined and their multipliers corresponding to multistability are calculated. Examples of the coexistence of families of stable stationary and non-stationary solutions are presented. The analysis is carried out for the growth functions of logistic and “hyperbolic” types. Depending on the parameters, scenarios can be obtained when only stationary solutions (coexistence of prey without predators and mixed combinations), as well as families of limit cycles, are realized in the phase space. The multistability scenarios considered in the work allow one to analyze the situations that arise in the presence of several related species in the range. These results are the basis for subsequent analysis when the parameters deviate from cosymmetric relationships.