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Often decisions in social groups are made by consensus. This applies, for example, to the examination in the technical committee for standardization (TC) before the approval of the national standard by Rosstandart. The standard is approved if and only if the secured consensus in the TC. The same approach to standards development was adopted in almost all countries and at the regional and international level. Previously published works of authors dedicated to the construction of a mathematical model of time to reach consensus in technical committees for standardization in terms of variation in the number of TC members and their level of authoritarianism. The present study is a continuation of these works for the case of the formation of coalitions that are often formed during the consideration of the draft standard to the TC. In the article the mathematical model is constructed to ensure consensus on the work of technical standardization committees in terms of coalitions. In the framework of the model it is shown that in the presence of coalitions consensus is not achievable. However, the coalition, as a rule, are overcome during the negotiation process, otherwise the number of the adopted standards would be extremely small. This paper analyzes the factors that influence the bridging coalitions: the value of the assignment and an index of the effect of the coalition. On the basis of statistical modelling of regular Markov chains is investigated their effects on the time to ensure consensus in the technical Committee. It is proved that the time to reach consensus significantly depends on the value of unilateral concessions coalition and weakly depends on the size of coalitions. Built regression model of dependence of the average number of approvals from the value of the assignment. It was revealed that even a small concession leads to the onset of consensus, increasing the size of the assignment results (with other factors being equal) to a sharp decline in time before the consensus. It is shown that the assignment of a larger coalition against small coalitions takes on average more time before consensus. The result has practical value for all organizational structures, where the emergence of coalitions entails the inability of decision-making in the framework of consensus and requires the consideration of various methods for reaching a consensus decision.

When making decisions in various fields of human activity, it is often required to create text documents. Traditionally, the study of texts is engaged in linguistics, which in a broad sense can be understood as a part of semiotics — the science of signs and sign systems, while semiotic objects are of different types. The method of rank distributions is widely used for the quantitative study of sign systems. Rank distribution is a set of item names sorted in descending order by frequency of occurrence. For frequency-rank distributions, researchers often use the term «power-law distributions».

In this paper, the rank distribution method is used to analyze the Criminal Code of various countries. The general idea of the approach to solving this problem is to consider the code as a text document, in which the sign is the measure of punishment for certain crimes. The document is presented as a list of occurrences of a specific word (character) and its derivatives (word forms). The combination of all these signs characters forms a punishment dictionary, for which the occurrence frequency of each punishment in the code text is calculated. This allows us to transform the constructed dictionary into a frequency dictionary of punishments and conduct its further research using the V. P. Maslov approach, proposed to analyze the linguistics problems. This approach introduces the concept of the virtual frequency of crime occurrence, which is an assessment measure of the real harm to society and the consequences of the crime committed in various spheres of human life. On this path, the paper proposes a parametrization of the rank distribution to analyze the punishment dictionary of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation concerning punishments for economic crimes. Various versions of the code are considered, and the constructed model was shown to reflect objectively undertaken over time by legislators its changes for the better. For the Criminal Codes in force in the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China, the texts including similar offenses and analogous to the Russian special section of the Special Part were studied. The rank distributions obtained in the article for the corresponding frequency dictionaries of codes coincide with those obtained by V. P. Maslov’s law, which essentially clarifies Zipf’s law. This allows us to conclude both the good text organization and the adequacy of the selected punishments for crimes.