All issues

The traditional approach to computing optimal game strategies of firms on oligopolistic markets and of indicators of such markets consists in studying linear dynamical games with quadratic criteria and solving generalized matrix Riccati equations.

The other approach proposed by the author is based on methods of operational calculus (in particular, Z-transform). This approach makes it possible to achieve economic meaningful decisions under wider field of parameter values. It characterizes by simplicity of computations and by necessary for economic analysis visibility. One of its advantages is that in many cases important for economic practice, it, in contrast to the traditional approach, provides the ability to make calculations using widespread spreadsheets, which allows to study the prospects for the development of oligopolistic markets to a wide range of professionals and consumers.

The article deals with the practical aspects of determining the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies of participants in oligopolistic markets on the basis of operational calculus, in particular the technique of computing the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies in Excel. As an illustration of the opportinities of the proposed methods of calculation, examples close to the practical problems of forecasting indicators of the markets of high-tech products are studied.

The results of calculations obtained by the author for numerous examples and real economic systems, both using the obtained relations on the basis of spreadsheets and using extended Riccati equations, are very close. In most of the considered practical problems, the deviation of the indicators calculated in accordance with the two approaches, as a rule, does not exceed 1.5–2%. The highest value of relative deviations (up to 3–5%) is observed at the beginning of the forecasting period. In typical cases, the period of relatively noticeable deviations is 3–5 moments of time. After the transition period, there is almost complete agreement of the values of the required indicators using both approaches.

The article deals with the development of a methodological approach to forecasting and modeling the socioeconomic consequences of viral epidemics in conditions of heterogeneous economic development of territorial systems. The relevance of the research stems from the need for rapid mechanisms of public management and stabilization of adverse epidemiological situation, taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of the spread of COVID-19, accompanied by a concentration of infection in large metropolitan areas and territories with high economic activity. The aim of the work is to substantiate a methodology to assess the spatial heterogeneity of the spread of coronavirus infection, find poles of its growth, emerging spatial clusters and zones of their influence with the assessment of inter-territorial relationships, as well as simulate the effects of worsening epidemiological situation on the dynamics of economic development of regional systems. The peculiarity of the developed approach is the spatial clustering of regional systems by the level of COVID-19 incidence, conducted using global and local spatial autocorrelation indices, various spatial weight matrices, and L.Anselin mutual influence matrix based on the statistical information of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. The study revealed a spatial cluster characterized by high levels of infection with COVID-19 with a strong zone of influence and stable interregional relationships with surrounding regions, as well as formed growth poles which are potential poles of further spread of coronavirus infection. Regression analysis using panel data not only confirmed the impact of COVID-19 incidence on the average number of employees in enterprises, the level of average monthly nominal wages, but also allowed to form a model for scenario prediction of the consequences of the spread of coronavirus infection. The results of this study can be used to form mechanisms to contain the coronavirus infection and stabilize socio-economic at macroeconomic and regional level and restore the economy of territorial systems, depending on the depth of the spread of infection and the level of economic damage caused.

The paper presents agent-based model for city formation named Technoscape which is both local and nonlocal. Technoscape can, to a certain degree, be also assumed as a model for emergence of global economy. The current version of the model implements very simple way of agents’ behavior and interaction, still the model provides rather interesting spatio-temporal patterns.

Locality and non-locality mean here the spatial features of the way the agents interact with each other and with geographical space upon which the evolution takes place. Technoscape agent is some conventional artisan, family, or а producing and trading firm, while there is no difference between production and trade. Agents are located upon and move through bounded two-dimensional space divided into square cells. The model demonstrates processes of agents’ concentration in a small set of cells, which is interpreted as «city» formation. Agents are immortal, they don’t mutate and evolve, though this is interesting perspective for the evolution of the model itself.

Technoscape provides some distinctively new type of self-organization. Partially, this type of selforganization resembles the behavior of segregation model by Thomas Shelling, still that model has evolution rules substantially different from Technoscape. In Shelling model there exist avalanches still simple equilibria exist if no new agents are added to the game board, while in Technoscape no such equilibria exist. At best, we can observe quasi-equilibrium, slowly changing global states.

One non-trivial phenomenon Technoscape exhibits, which also contrasts to Shelling segregation model, is the ability of agents to concentrate in local cells (interpreted as cities) even explicitly and totally ignoring local interactions, using non-local interactions only.

At the same time, while the agents tend to concentrate in large one-cell cities, large scale of such cities does not guarantee them from decay: there always exists a process of «enticement» of agents and their flow to new cities.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the nature of global demographic and economic development began to change rapidly: the continuously accelerating growth of the main characteristics that took place over the previous two hundred years was replaced by a sharp slowdown. In the context of these changes, the role of a long-term forecast of global dynamics is increasing. At the same time, the forecast should be based not on inertial projection of past trends into future periods, but on mathematical modeling of fundamental patterns of historical development. The article presents preliminary results of research on mathematical modeling and forecasting of global demographic and economic dynamics based on this approach. The basic dynamic equations reflecting this dynamics are proposed, the modification of these equations in relation to different historical epochs is justified. For each historical epoch, based on the analysis of the corresponding system of equations, a phase portrait was determined and its features were analyzed. Based on this analysis, conclusions were drawn about the patterns of world development in the period under review.

It is shown that mathematical description of technology development is important for modeling historical dynamics. A method for describing technological dynamics is proposed, on the basis of which the corresponding mathematical equations are proposed.

Three stages of historical development are considered: the stage of agrarian society (before the beginning of the XIX century), the stage of industrial society (XIX–XX centuries) and the modern era. The proposed mathematical model shows that an agrarian society is characterized by cyclical demographic and economic dynamics, while an industrial society is characterized by an increase in demographic and economic characteristics close to hyperbolic.

The results of mathematical modeling have shown that humanity is currently moving to a fundamentally new phase of historical development. There is a slowdown in growth and the transition of human society into a new phase state, the shape of which has not yet been determined. Various options for further development are considered.

Epidemics severely destabilize economies by reducing productivity, weakening consumer spending, and overwhelming public infrastructure, often culminating in economic recessions. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the critical role of nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as lockdowns, in containing infectious disease transmission. This study investigates how the progression of epidemics and the implementation of lockdown policies shape the economic well-being of populations. By integrating compartmental ordinary differential equation (ODE) models, the research analyzes the interplay between epidemic dynamics and economic outcomes, particularly focusing on how varying lockdown intensities influence both disease spread and population wealth. Findings reveal that epidemics inflict significant economic damage, but timely and stringent lockdowns can mitigate healthcare system overload by sharply reducing infection peaks and delaying the epidemic’s trajectory. However, carefully timed lockdown relaxation is equally vital to prevent resurgent outbreaks. The study identifies key epidemiological thresholds—such as transmission rates, recovery rates, and the basic reproduction number $(\mathfrak{R}0)$ — that determine the effectiveness of lockdowns. Analytically, it pinpoints the optimal proportion of isolated individuals required to minimize total infections in scenarios where permanent immunity is assumed. Economically, the analysis quantifies lockdown impacts by tracking population wealth, demonstrating that economic outcomes depend heavily on the fraction of isolated individuals who remain economically productive. Higher proportions of productive individuals during lockdowns correlate with better wealth retention, even under fixed epidemic conditions. These insights equip policymakers with actionable frameworks to design balanced lockdown strategies that curb disease spread while safeguarding economic stability during future health crises.

In this paper we consider mathematical model to control water quality. We study a system with two-level hierarchy: one environmental organization (supervisor) at the top level and a few industrial enterprises (agents) at the lower level. The main goal of the supervisor is to keep water pollution level below certain value, while enterprises pollute water, as a side effect of the manufacturing process. Supervisor achieves its goal by charging a penalty for enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises choose how much to purify their wastewater to maximize their income.The fee increases the budget of the supervisor. Moreover, effulent fees are charged for the quantity and/or quality of the discharged pollution. Unfortunately, in practice, such charges are ineffective due to the insufficient tax size. The article solves the problem of determining the optimal size of the charge for pollution discharge, which allows maintaining the quality of river water in the rear range.

We describe system members goals with target functionals, and describe water pollution level and enterprises state as system of ordinary differential equations. We consider the problem from both supervisor and enterprises sides. From agents’ point a normal-form game arises, where we search for Nash equilibrium and for the supervisor, we search for Stackelberg equilibrium. We propose numerical algorithms for finding both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. When we construct Nash equilibrium, we solve optimal control problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. We construct Hamilton’s function and solve corresponding system of partial differential equations with shooting method and finite difference method. Numerical calculations show that the low penalty for enterprises results in increasing pollution level, when relatively high penalty can result in enterprises bankruptcy. This leads to the problem of choosing optimal penalty, which requires considering problem from the supervisor point. In that case we use the method of qualitatively representative scenarios for supervisor and Pontryagin’s maximum principle for agents to find optimal control for the system. At last, we compute system consistency ratio and test algorithms for different data. The results show that a hierarchical control is required to provide system stability.

The problem of harvest optimization remains a central challenge in mathematical biology. The concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), widely used in optimal exploitation theory, proposes maintaining target populations at levels ensuring maximum reproduction, theoretically balancing economic benefits with resource conservation. While MSYbased management promotes population stability and system resilience, it faces significant limitations due to complex intrapopulation structures and nonlinear dynamics in exploited species. Of particular concern are the evolutionary consequences of harvesting, as artificial selection may drive changes divergent from natural selection pressures. Empirical evidence confirms that selective harvesting alters behavioral traits, reduces offspring quality, and modifies population gene pools. In contrast, the genetic impacts of non-selective harvesting remain poorly understood and require further investigation.

This study examines how non-selective harvesting with constant removal rates affects evolution in genetically heterogeneous populations. We model genetic diversity controlled by a single diallelic locus, where different genotypes dominate at high/low densities: r-strategists (high fecundity) versus K-strategists (resource-limited resilience). The classical ecological and genetic model with discrete time is considered. The model assumes that the fitness of each genotype linearly depends on the population size. By including the harvesting withdrawal coefficient, the model allows for linking the problem of optimizing harvest with the that of predicting genotype selection.

Analytical results demonstrate that under MSY harvesting the equilibrium genetic composition remains unchanged while population size halves. The type of genetic equilibrium may shift, as optimal harvest rates differ between equilibria. Natural K-strategist dominance may reverse toward r-strategists, whose high reproduction compensates for harvest losses. Critical harvesting thresholds triggering strategy shifts were identified.

These findings explain why exploited populations show slow recovery after harvesting cessation: exploitation reinforces adaptations beneficial under removal pressure but maladaptive in natural conditions. For instance, captive arctic foxes select for high-productivity genotypes, whereas wild populations favor lower-fecundity/higher-survival phenotypes. This underscores the necessity of incorporating genetic dynamics into sustainable harvesting management strategies, as MSY policies may inadvertently alter evolutionary trajectories through density-dependent selection processes. Recovery periods must account for genetic adaptation timescales in management frameworks.

This article presents an integrated dynamic model of eco-economic system of the Republic of Armenia (RA). This model is constructed using system dynamics methods, which allow to consider the major feedback related to key characteristics of eco-economic system. Such model is a two-objective optimization problem where as target functions the level of air pollution and gross profit of national economy are considered. The air pollution is minimized due to modernization of stationary and mobile sources of pollution at simultaneous maximization of gross profit of national economy. At the same time considered eco-economic system is characterized by the presence of internal constraints that must be accounted at acceptance of strategic decisions. As a result, we proposed a systematic approach that allows forming sustainable solutions for the development of the production sector of RA while minimizing the impact on the environment. With the proposed approach, in particular, we can form a plan for optimal enterprise modernization and predict long-term dynamics of harmful emissions into the atmosphere.

The article deals with the modeling of the number of employed population by branches of the economy at the national and regional levels. The lack of targeted distribution of workers in a market economy requires the study of systemic processes in the labor market that lead to different dynamics of the number of employed in the sectors of the economy. In this case, personal strategies for choosing labor activity by economic agents become important. The presence of different strategies leads to the emergence of strata in the labor market with a dynamically changing number of employees, unevenly distributed among the sectors of the economy. As a result, non-linear fluctuations in the number of employed population can be observed, the toolkit of agentbased modeling is relevant for the study of the fluctuations. In the article, we examined in-phase and anti-phase fluctuations in the number of employees by economic activity on the example of the Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia. The fluctuations found in the time series of statistical data for 2008–2016. We show that such fluctuations appear by age groups of workers. In view of this, we put forward a hypothesis that the agent in the labor market chooses a place of work by a strategy, related with his age group. It directly affects the distribution of the number of employed for different cohorts and the total number of employed in the sectors of the economy. The agent determines the strategy taking into account the socio-economic characteristics of the branches of the economy (different levels of wages, working conditions, prestige of the profession). We construct a basic agentoriented model of a three-branch economy to test the hypothesis. The model takes into account various strategies of economic agents, including the choice of the highest wages, the highest prestige of the profession and the best working conditions by the agent. As a result of numerical experiments, we show that the availability of various industry selection strategies and the age preferences of employers within the industry lead to periodic and complex dynamics of the number of different-aged employees. Age preferences may be a consequence, for example, the requirements of employer for the existence of work experience and education. Also, significant changes in the age structure of the employed population may result from migration.

One of the principles of forming a competitive market environment is to create conditions for economic agents to implement Nash – Cournot optimal strategies. With the standard approach to determining Nash – Cournot optimal market strategies, economic agents must have complete information about the indicators and dynamic characteristics of all market participants. Which is not true.

In this regard, to find Nash – Cournot optimal solutions in dynamic models, it is necessary to have a coordinator who has complete information about the participants. However, in the case of a large number of game participants, even if the coordinator has the necessary information, computational difficulties arise associated with the need to solve a large number of coupled equations (in the case of linear dynamic games — Riccati matrix equations).

In this regard, there is a need to decompose the general problem of determining optimal strategies for market participants into private (local) problems. Approaches based on the iterative decomposition of coupled matrix Riccati equations and the solution of local Riccati equations were studied for linear dynamic games with a quadratic criterion. This article considers a simpler approach to the iterative determination of the Nash – Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly, by decomposition using operational calculus (operator method).

The proposed approach is based on the following procedure. A virtual coordinator, which has information about the parameters of the inverse demand function, forms prices for the prospective period. Oligopolists, given fixed price dynamics, determine their strategies in accordance with a slightly modified optimality criterion. The optimal volumes of production of the oligopolists are sent to the coordinator, who, based on the iterative algorithm, adjusts the price dynamics at the previous step.

The proposed procedure is illustrated by the example of a static and dynamic model of rational behavior of oligopoly participants who maximize the net present value (NPV). Using the methods of operational calculus (and in particular, the inverse Z-transformation), conditions are found under which the iterative procedure leads to equilibrium levels of price and production volumes in the case of linear dynamic games with both quadratic and nonlinear (concave) optimization criteria.

The approach considered is used in relation to examples of duopoly, triopoly, duopoly on the market with a differentiated product, duopoly with interacting oligopolists with a linear inverse demand function. Comparison of the results of calculating the dynamics of price and production volumes of oligopolists for the considered examples based on coupled equations of the matrix Riccati equations in Matlab (in the table — Riccati), as well as in accordance with the proposed iterative method in the widely available Excel system shows their practical identity.

In addition, the application of the proposed iterative procedure is illustrated by the example of a duopoly with a nonlinear demand function.