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The model of market pricing in duopoly describing the prices dynamics as a two-dimensional map is presented. It is shown that the fixed point of the map coincides with the local Nash-equilibrium price in duopoly game. There have been numerically identified a bifurcation of the fixed point, shown the scheme of transition from periodic to chaotic mode through a doubling period. To ensure the sustainability of local Nashequilibrium price the controlling chaos mechanism has been proposed. This mechanism allows to harmonize the economic interests of the firms and to form the balanced pricing policy.

In this paper we consider a new modification of the discrete version of Mikhailov’s ‘power–society’ model, previously proposed by the author. This modification includes social-economical dynamics and corruption of the system similarly to continuous ‘power–society–economics–corruption’ model but is based on a stochastic cellular automaton describing the dynamics of power distribution in a hierarchy. This new version is founded on previously proposed ‘power–society’ system modeling cellular automaton, its cell state space enriched with variables corresponding to population, economic production, production assets volume and corruption level. The social-economical structure of the model is inherited from Solow and deterministic continuous ‘power–society–economics–corruption’ models. At the same time the new model is flexible, allowing to consider regional differentiation in all social and economical dynamics parameters, to use various production and demography models and to account for goods transit between the regions. A simulation system was built, including three power hierarchy levels, five regions and 100 municipalities. and a number of numerical experiments were carried out. This research yielded results showing specific changes of the dynamics in power distribution in hierarchy when corruption level increases. While corruption is zero (similar to the previous version of the model) the power distribution in hierarchy asymptotically tends to one of stationary states. If the corruption level increases substantially, volume of power in the system is subjected to irregular oscillations, and only much later tends to a stationary value. The meaning of these results can be interpreted as the fact that the stability of power hierarchy decreases when corruption level goes up.

The traditional approach to computing optimal game strategies of firms on oligopolistic markets and of indicators of such markets consists in studying linear dynamical games with quadratic criteria and solving generalized matrix Riccati equations.

The other approach proposed by the author is based on methods of operational calculus (in particular, Z-transform). This approach makes it possible to achieve economic meaningful decisions under wider field of parameter values. It characterizes by simplicity of computations and by necessary for economic analysis visibility. One of its advantages is that in many cases important for economic practice, it, in contrast to the traditional approach, provides the ability to make calculations using widespread spreadsheets, which allows to study the prospects for the development of oligopolistic markets to a wide range of professionals and consumers.

The article deals with the practical aspects of determining the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies of participants in oligopolistic markets on the basis of operational calculus, in particular the technique of computing the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies in Excel. As an illustration of the opportinities of the proposed methods of calculation, examples close to the practical problems of forecasting indicators of the markets of high-tech products are studied.

The results of calculations obtained by the author for numerous examples and real economic systems, both using the obtained relations on the basis of spreadsheets and using extended Riccati equations, are very close. In most of the considered practical problems, the deviation of the indicators calculated in accordance with the two approaches, as a rule, does not exceed 1.5–2%. The highest value of relative deviations (up to 3–5%) is observed at the beginning of the forecasting period. In typical cases, the period of relatively noticeable deviations is 3–5 moments of time. After the transition period, there is almost complete agreement of the values of the required indicators using both approaches.

The article deals with the development of a methodological approach to forecasting and modeling the socioeconomic consequences of viral epidemics in conditions of heterogeneous economic development of territorial systems. The relevance of the research stems from the need for rapid mechanisms of public management and stabilization of adverse epidemiological situation, taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of the spread of COVID-19, accompanied by a concentration of infection in large metropolitan areas and territories with high economic activity. The aim of the work is to substantiate a methodology to assess the spatial heterogeneity of the spread of coronavirus infection, find poles of its growth, emerging spatial clusters and zones of their influence with the assessment of inter-territorial relationships, as well as simulate the effects of worsening epidemiological situation on the dynamics of economic development of regional systems. The peculiarity of the developed approach is the spatial clustering of regional systems by the level of COVID-19 incidence, conducted using global and local spatial autocorrelation indices, various spatial weight matrices, and L.Anselin mutual influence matrix based on the statistical information of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. The study revealed a spatial cluster characterized by high levels of infection with COVID-19 with a strong zone of influence and stable interregional relationships with surrounding regions, as well as formed growth poles which are potential poles of further spread of coronavirus infection. Regression analysis using panel data not only confirmed the impact of COVID-19 incidence on the average number of employees in enterprises, the level of average monthly nominal wages, but also allowed to form a model for scenario prediction of the consequences of the spread of coronavirus infection. The results of this study can be used to form mechanisms to contain the coronavirus infection and stabilize socio-economic at macroeconomic and regional level and restore the economy of territorial systems, depending on the depth of the spread of infection and the level of economic damage caused.

The paper presents agent-based model for city formation named Technoscape which is both local and nonlocal. Technoscape can, to a certain degree, be also assumed as a model for emergence of global economy. The current version of the model implements very simple way of agents’ behavior and interaction, still the model provides rather interesting spatio-temporal patterns.

Locality and non-locality mean here the spatial features of the way the agents interact with each other and with geographical space upon which the evolution takes place. Technoscape agent is some conventional artisan, family, or а producing and trading firm, while there is no difference between production and trade. Agents are located upon and move through bounded two-dimensional space divided into square cells. The model demonstrates processes of agents’ concentration in a small set of cells, which is interpreted as «city» formation. Agents are immortal, they don’t mutate and evolve, though this is interesting perspective for the evolution of the model itself.

Technoscape provides some distinctively new type of self-organization. Partially, this type of selforganization resembles the behavior of segregation model by Thomas Shelling, still that model has evolution rules substantially different from Technoscape. In Shelling model there exist avalanches still simple equilibria exist if no new agents are added to the game board, while in Technoscape no such equilibria exist. At best, we can observe quasi-equilibrium, slowly changing global states.

One non-trivial phenomenon Technoscape exhibits, which also contrasts to Shelling segregation model, is the ability of agents to concentrate in local cells (interpreted as cities) even explicitly and totally ignoring local interactions, using non-local interactions only.

At the same time, while the agents tend to concentrate in large one-cell cities, large scale of such cities does not guarantee them from decay: there always exists a process of «enticement» of agents and their flow to new cities.

The dynamics of public attention to COVID-19 epidemic is studied. The level of public attention is described by the daily number of search requests in Google made by users from a given country. In the empirical part of the work, data on the number of requests and the number of infected cases for a number of countries are considered. It is shown that in all cases the maximum of public attention occurs earlier than the maximum daily number of newly infected individuals. Thus, for a certain period of time, the growth of the epidemics occurs in parallel with the decline in public attention to it. It is also shown that the decline in the number of requests is described by an exponential function of time. In order to describe the revealed empirical pattern, a mathematical model is proposed, which is a modification of the model of the decline in attention after a one-time political event. The model develops the approach that considers decision-making by an individual as a member of the society in which the information process takes place. This approach assumes that an individual’s decision about whether or not to make a request on a given day about COVID is based on two factors. One of them is an attitude that reflects the individual’s long-term interest in a given topic and accumulates the individual’s previous experience, cultural preferences, social and economic status. The second is the dynamic factor of public attention to the epidemic, which changes during the process under consideration under the influence of informational stimuli. With regard to the subject under consideration, information stimuli are related to epidemic dynamics. The behavioral hypothesis is that if on some day the sum of the attitude and the dynamic factor exceeds a certain threshold value, then on that day the individual in question makes a search request on the topic of COVID. The general logic is that the higher the rate of infection growth, the higher the information stimulus, the slower decreases public attention to the pandemic. Thus, the constructed model made it possible to correlate the rate of exponential decrease in the number of requests with the rate of growth in the number of cases. The regularity found with the help of the model was tested on empirical data. It was found that the Student’s statistic is 4.56, which allows us to reject the hypothesis of the absence of a correlation with a significance level of 0.01.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the nature of global demographic and economic development began to change rapidly: the continuously accelerating growth of the main characteristics that took place over the previous two hundred years was replaced by a sharp slowdown. In the context of these changes, the role of a long-term forecast of global dynamics is increasing. At the same time, the forecast should be based not on inertial projection of past trends into future periods, but on mathematical modeling of fundamental patterns of historical development. The article presents preliminary results of research on mathematical modeling and forecasting of global demographic and economic dynamics based on this approach. The basic dynamic equations reflecting this dynamics are proposed, the modification of these equations in relation to different historical epochs is justified. For each historical epoch, based on the analysis of the corresponding system of equations, a phase portrait was determined and its features were analyzed. Based on this analysis, conclusions were drawn about the patterns of world development in the period under review.

It is shown that mathematical description of technology development is important for modeling historical dynamics. A method for describing technological dynamics is proposed, on the basis of which the corresponding mathematical equations are proposed.

Three stages of historical development are considered: the stage of agrarian society (before the beginning of the XIX century), the stage of industrial society (XIX–XX centuries) and the modern era. The proposed mathematical model shows that an agrarian society is characterized by cyclical demographic and economic dynamics, while an industrial society is characterized by an increase in demographic and economic characteristics close to hyperbolic.

The results of mathematical modeling have shown that humanity is currently moving to a fundamentally new phase of historical development. There is a slowdown in growth and the transition of human society into a new phase state, the shape of which has not yet been determined. Various options for further development are considered.

Epidemics severely destabilize economies by reducing productivity, weakening consumer spending, and overwhelming public infrastructure, often culminating in economic recessions. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the critical role of nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as lockdowns, in containing infectious disease transmission. This study investigates how the progression of epidemics and the implementation of lockdown policies shape the economic well-being of populations. By integrating compartmental ordinary differential equation (ODE) models, the research analyzes the interplay between epidemic dynamics and economic outcomes, particularly focusing on how varying lockdown intensities influence both disease spread and population wealth. Findings reveal that epidemics inflict significant economic damage, but timely and stringent lockdowns can mitigate healthcare system overload by sharply reducing infection peaks and delaying the epidemic’s trajectory. However, carefully timed lockdown relaxation is equally vital to prevent resurgent outbreaks. The study identifies key epidemiological thresholds—such as transmission rates, recovery rates, and the basic reproduction number $(\mathfrak{R}0)$ — that determine the effectiveness of lockdowns. Analytically, it pinpoints the optimal proportion of isolated individuals required to minimize total infections in scenarios where permanent immunity is assumed. Economically, the analysis quantifies lockdown impacts by tracking population wealth, demonstrating that economic outcomes depend heavily on the fraction of isolated individuals who remain economically productive. Higher proportions of productive individuals during lockdowns correlate with better wealth retention, even under fixed epidemic conditions. These insights equip policymakers with actionable frameworks to design balanced lockdown strategies that curb disease spread while safeguarding economic stability during future health crises.

An effective regional policy in order to stabilize production is impossible without an analysis of the dynamics of economic processes taking place. This article focuses on developing a mathematical model reflecting the interaction of several economic agents with regard to their interests. Developing such a model and its study can be considered as an important step in solving theoretical and practical problems of managing growth.

In this paper we consider mathematical model to control water quality. We study a system with two-level hierarchy: one environmental organization (supervisor) at the top level and a few industrial enterprises (agents) at the lower level. The main goal of the supervisor is to keep water pollution level below certain value, while enterprises pollute water, as a side effect of the manufacturing process. Supervisor achieves its goal by charging a penalty for enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises choose how much to purify their wastewater to maximize their income.The fee increases the budget of the supervisor. Moreover, effulent fees are charged for the quantity and/or quality of the discharged pollution. Unfortunately, in practice, such charges are ineffective due to the insufficient tax size. The article solves the problem of determining the optimal size of the charge for pollution discharge, which allows maintaining the quality of river water in the rear range.

We describe system members goals with target functionals, and describe water pollution level and enterprises state as system of ordinary differential equations. We consider the problem from both supervisor and enterprises sides. From agents’ point a normal-form game arises, where we search for Nash equilibrium and for the supervisor, we search for Stackelberg equilibrium. We propose numerical algorithms for finding both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. When we construct Nash equilibrium, we solve optimal control problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. We construct Hamilton’s function and solve corresponding system of partial differential equations with shooting method and finite difference method. Numerical calculations show that the low penalty for enterprises results in increasing pollution level, when relatively high penalty can result in enterprises bankruptcy. This leads to the problem of choosing optimal penalty, which requires considering problem from the supervisor point. In that case we use the method of qualitatively representative scenarios for supervisor and Pontryagin’s maximum principle for agents to find optimal control for the system. At last, we compute system consistency ratio and test algorithms for different data. The results show that a hierarchical control is required to provide system stability.