All issues

In the last decade along with classical cytotoxic agents, antiangiogenic drugs have been actively used in cancer chemotherapy. They are not aimed at killing malignant cells, but at blocking the process of angiogenesis, i.e., the growth of new vessels in the tumor and its surrounding tissues. Agents that stimulate angiogenesis, in particular, vascular endothelial growth factor, are actively produced by tumor cells in the state of metabolic stress. It is believed that blocking of tumor neovascularization should lead to a shortage of nutrients flow to the tumor, and thus can stop, or at least significantly slow down its growth. Clinical practice on the use of first antiangiogenic drug bevacizumab has shown that in some cases such therapy does not influence the growth rate of the tumor, whereas for other types of malignant neoplasms antiangiogenic therapy has a high antitumor effect. However, it has been shown that along with successful slowing of tumor growth, therapy with bevacizumab can induce directed tumor progression to a more invasive, and therefore more lethal, type. These data require theoretical analysis and rationale for the evolutionary factors that lead to the observation of epithelial-mesenchymal transition. For this purpose we have developed a spatially distributed mathematical model of growth and antiangiogenic therapy of heterogeneous tumor consisting of two subpopulations of malignant cells. One of subpopulations possesses inherent characteristics of epithelial phenotype, i.e., low motility and high proliferation rate, the other one corresponds to mesenchymal phenotype having high motility and low proliferation rate. We have performed the investigation of competition between these subpopulations of heterogeneous tumor in the cases of tumor growth without therapy and under bevacizumab monotherapy. It is shown that constant use of antiangiogenic drug leads to an increase of the region in parameter space, where the dominance of mesenchymal phenotype takes place, i.e., within a certain range of parameters in the absence of therapy epithelial phenotype is dominant but during bevacizumab administration mesenchymal phenotype begins to dominate. This result provides a theoretical basis of the clinically observed directed tumor progression to more invasive type under antiangiogenic therapy.

A dynamic game theoretic model of struggle against corruption in resource allocation is considered. It is supposed that the system of resource allocation includes one principal, one or several supervisors, and several agents. The relations between them are hierarchical: the principal influences to the supervisors, and they in turn exert influence on the agents. It is assumed that the supervisor can be corrupted. The agents propose bribes to the supervisor who in exchange allocates additional resources to them. It is also supposed that the principal is not corrupted and does not have her own purposes. The model is investigated from the point of view of the supervisor and the agents. From the point of view of agents a non-cooperative game arises with a set of Nash equilibria as a solution. The set is found analytically on the base of Pontryagin maximum principle for the specific class of model functions. From the point of view of the supervisor a hierarchical Germeyer game of the type Г_2t is built, and the respective algorithm of its solution is proposed. The punishment strategy is found analytically, and the reward strategy is built numerically on the base of a discrete analogue of the initial continuous- time model. It is supposed that all agents can change their strategies in the same time instants only a finite number of times. Thus, the supervisor can maximize his objective function of many variables instead of maximization of the objective functional. A method of qualitatively representative scenarios is used for the solution. The idea of this method consists in that it is possible to choose a very small number of scenarios among all potential ones that represent all qualitatively different trajectories of the system dynamics. These scenarios differ in principle while all other scenarios yield no essentially new results. Then a complete enumeration of the qualitatively representative scenarios becomes possible. After that, the supervisor reports to the agents the rewardpunishment control mechanism.

This article describes possible improvements for the simultaneous multi-stage transport model code for speeding up computations and improving the model detailing. The model consists of two blocks, where the first block is intended to calculate the correspondence matrix, and the second block computes the equilibrium distribution of traffic flows along the routes. The first block uses a matrix of transport costs that calculates a matrix of correspondences. It describes the costs (time in our case) of travel from one area to another. The second block presents how exactly the drivers (agents) are distributed along the possible paths. So, knowing the distribution of the flows along the paths, it is possible to calculate the cost matrix. Equilibrium in a two-stage traffic flow model is a fixed point of a sequence of the two described models. Thus, in this paper we report an attempt to influence the calculation speed of Dijkstra’s algorithm part of the model. It is used to calculate the shortest path from one point to another, which should be re-calculated after each iteration of the flow distribution part. We also study and implement the road pricing in the model code, as well as we replace the Sinkhorn algorithm in the calculation of the correspondence matrix part with its faster implementation. In the beginning of the paper, we provide a short theoretical overview of the transport modelling motivation; we discuss current approaches to the modelling and provide an example for demonstration of how the whole cycle of multi-stage transport modelling works.

In this article we propose a new approach to the analysis of econometric industry parameters for the industry consolidation level. The research is based on the simple industry automatic control model. The state of the industry is measured by quarterly obtained econometric parameters from each industry’s company provided by the tax control regulator. An approach to analysis of the industry, which does not provide for tracking the economy of each company, but explores the parameters of the set of all companies as a whole, is proposed. Quarterly obtained econometric parameters from each industry’s company are Income, Quantity of employers, Taxes, and Income from Software Licenses. The ABC analysis method was modified by ABCD analysis (D — companies with zero-level impact to industry metrics) and used to make the results obtained for different indicators comparable. Pareto charts were formed for the set of econometric indicators.

To estimate the industry monopolization, the Herfindahl – Hirschman index was calculated for the most sensitive companies metrics. Using the HHI approach, it was proved that COVID-19 does not lead to changes in the monopolization of the Russian IT industry.

As the most visually obvious approach to the industry visualization, scattering diagrams in combination with the Pareto graph colors were proposed. The affect of the accreditation procedure is clearly observed by scattering diagram in combination with red/black dots for accredited and nonaccredited companies respectively.

The last reported result is the proposal to use the Licenses End-to-End Product Identification as the market structure control instrument. It is the basis to avoid the multiple accounting of the licenses reselling within the chain of software distribution.

The results of research could be the basis for future IT industry analysis and simulation on the agent based approach.

The most important principle of military science and border security is the principle of concentrating the main efforts on the main directions and tasks. At the tactical level, there are many mathematical models for computing the optimal resource allocation by directions and objects, whereas at the state level there are no corresponding models. Using the statistical data on the results of the protection of the US border, an exponential type border production function parameter is calculated that reflects the organizational and technological capabilities of the border guard. The production function determines the dependence of the probability of detaining offenders from the density of border guards per kilometer of the border. Financial indicators in the production function are not taken into account, as the border maintenance budget and border equipment correlate with the number of border agents. The objective function of the border guards is defined — the total prevented damage from detained violators taking into account their expected danger for the state and society, which is to be maximized. Using Slater's condition, the solution of the problem was found — optimal density of border guard was calculated for the regions of the state. Having a model of resource allocation, the example of the three border regions of the United States has also solved the reverse problem — threats in the regions have been assessed based on the known allocation of resources. The expected danger from an individual offender on the US-Canada border is 2–5 times higher than from an offender on the US-Mexican border. The results of the calculations are consistent with the views of US security experts: illegal migrants are mostly detained on the US-Mexican border, while potential terrorists prefer to use other channels of penetration into the US (including the US-Canadian border), where the risks of being detained are minimal. Also, the results of the calculations are consistent with the established practice of border protection: in 2013 the number of border guards outside the checkpoints on the US-Mexican border increased by 2 times compared with 2001, while on the American-Canadian border — 4 times. The practice of border protection and the views of specialists give grounds for approval of the verification of the model.

The paper presents agent-based model for city formation named Technoscape which is both local and nonlocal. Technoscape can, to a certain degree, be also assumed as a model for emergence of global economy. The current version of the model implements very simple way of agents’ behavior and interaction, still the model provides rather interesting spatio-temporal patterns.

Locality and non-locality mean here the spatial features of the way the agents interact with each other and with geographical space upon which the evolution takes place. Technoscape agent is some conventional artisan, family, or а producing and trading firm, while there is no difference between production and trade. Agents are located upon and move through bounded two-dimensional space divided into square cells. The model demonstrates processes of agents’ concentration in a small set of cells, which is interpreted as «city» formation. Agents are immortal, they don’t mutate and evolve, though this is interesting perspective for the evolution of the model itself.

Technoscape provides some distinctively new type of self-organization. Partially, this type of selforganization resembles the behavior of segregation model by Thomas Shelling, still that model has evolution rules substantially different from Technoscape. In Shelling model there exist avalanches still simple equilibria exist if no new agents are added to the game board, while in Technoscape no such equilibria exist. At best, we can observe quasi-equilibrium, slowly changing global states.

One non-trivial phenomenon Technoscape exhibits, which also contrasts to Shelling segregation model, is the ability of agents to concentrate in local cells (interpreted as cities) even explicitly and totally ignoring local interactions, using non-local interactions only.

At the same time, while the agents tend to concentrate in large one-cell cities, large scale of such cities does not guarantee them from decay: there always exists a process of «enticement» of agents and their flow to new cities.

This work provides a new approach for constructing high-precision routes based on data from transport detectors inside the SUMO traffic modeling package. Existing tools such as flowrouter and routeSampler have a number of disadvantages, such as the lack of interaction with the network in the process of building routes. Our rlRouter uses multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where the agents are incoming lanes and the environment is the road network. By performing actions to launch vehicles, agents receive a reward for matching data from transport detectors. Parameter Sharing DQN with the LSTM backbone of the Q-function was used as an algorithm for multi-agent reinforcement learning.

Since the rlRouter is trained inside the SUMO simulation, it can restore routes better by taking into account the interaction of vehicles within the network with each other and with the network infrastructure. We have modeled diverse traffic situations on three different junctions in order to compare the performance of SUMO’s routers with the rlRouter. We used Mean Absoluter Error (MAE) as the measure of the deviation from both cumulative detectors and routes data. The rlRouter achieved the highest compliance with the data from the detectors. We also found that by maximizing the reward for matching detectors, the resulting routes also get closer to the real ones. Despite the fact that the routes recovered using rlRouter are superior to the routes obtained using SUMO tools, they do not fully correspond to the real ones, due to the natural limitations of induction-loop detectors. To achieve more plausible routes, it is necessary to equip junctions with other types of transport counters, for example, camera detectors.

An effective regional policy in order to stabilize production is impossible without an analysis of the dynamics of economic processes taking place. This article focuses on developing a mathematical model reflecting the interaction of several economic agents with regard to their interests. Developing such a model and its study can be considered as an important step in solving theoretical and practical problems of managing growth.

In this paper we consider mathematical model to control water quality. We study a system with two-level hierarchy: one environmental organization (supervisor) at the top level and a few industrial enterprises (agents) at the lower level. The main goal of the supervisor is to keep water pollution level below certain value, while enterprises pollute water, as a side effect of the manufacturing process. Supervisor achieves its goal by charging a penalty for enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises choose how much to purify their wastewater to maximize their income.The fee increases the budget of the supervisor. Moreover, effulent fees are charged for the quantity and/or quality of the discharged pollution. Unfortunately, in practice, such charges are ineffective due to the insufficient tax size. The article solves the problem of determining the optimal size of the charge for pollution discharge, which allows maintaining the quality of river water in the rear range.

We describe system members goals with target functionals, and describe water pollution level and enterprises state as system of ordinary differential equations. We consider the problem from both supervisor and enterprises sides. From agents’ point a normal-form game arises, where we search for Nash equilibrium and for the supervisor, we search for Stackelberg equilibrium. We propose numerical algorithms for finding both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. When we construct Nash equilibrium, we solve optimal control problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. We construct Hamilton’s function and solve corresponding system of partial differential equations with shooting method and finite difference method. Numerical calculations show that the low penalty for enterprises results in increasing pollution level, when relatively high penalty can result in enterprises bankruptcy. This leads to the problem of choosing optimal penalty, which requires considering problem from the supervisor point. In that case we use the method of qualitatively representative scenarios for supervisor and Pontryagin’s maximum principle for agents to find optimal control for the system. At last, we compute system consistency ratio and test algorithms for different data. The results show that a hierarchical control is required to provide system stability.

The article describes a simulation agent-based model of intercultural interactions in a country whose population belongs to different cultures. It is believed that the space of cultures can be represented as a Hilbert space, in which certain subspaces correspond to different cultures. In the model, the concept of culture is understood as a structured subspace of the Hilbert space. This makes it possible to describe the state of agents by a vector in a Hilbert space. It is believed that each agent is described by belonging to a certain «culture». The number of agents belonging to certain cultures is determined by demographic processes that correspond to these cultures, the depth and integrity of the educational process, as well as the intensity of intercultural contacts. Interaction between agents occurs within clusters, into which, according to certain criteria, the entire set of agents is divided. When agents interact according to a certain algorithm, the length and angle that characterize the state of the agent change. In the process of imitation, depending on the number of agents belonging to different cultures, the intensity of demographic and educational processes, as well as the intensity of intercultural contacts, aggregates of agents (clusters) are formed, the agents of which belong to different cultures. Such intercultural clusters do not entirely belong to any of the cultures initially considered in the model. Such intercultural clusters create uncertainties in cultural dynamics. The paper presents the results of simulation experiments that illustrate the influence of demographic and educational processes on the dynamics of intercultural clusters. The issues of the development of the proposed approach to the study (discussion) of the transitional states of the development of cultures are discussed.