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Modeling the fight against terrorist, pirate and robbery acts at sea is an urgent scientific task due to the prevalence of force acts and the insufficient number of works on this issue. The actions of pirates and terrorists are diverse. Using a base ship, they can attack ships up to 450–500 miles from the coast. Having chosen the target, they pursue it and use the weapons to board the ship. Actions to free a ship captured by pirates or terrorists include: blocking the ship, predicting where pirates might be on the ship, penetrating (from board to board, by air or from under water) and cleaning up the ship’s premises. An analysis of the special literature on the actions of pirates and terrorists showed that the act of force (and actions to neutralize it) consists of two stages: firstly, blocking the vessel, which consists in forcing it to stop, and secondly, neutralizing the team (terrorist groups, pirates), including penetration of a ship (ship) and its cleaning. The stages of the cycle are matched by indicators — the probability of blocking and the probability of neutralization. The variables of the act of force model are the number of ships (ships, boats) of the attackers and defenders, as well as the strength of the capture group of the attackers and the crew of the ship - the victim of the attack. Model parameters (indicators of naval and combat superiority) were estimated using the maximum likelihood method using an international database of incidents at sea. The values of these parameters are 7.6–8.5. Such high values of superiority parameters reflect the parties' ability to act in force acts. An analytical method for calculating excellence parameters is proposed and statistically substantiated. The following indicators are taken into account in the model: the ability of the parties to detect the enemy, the speed and maneuverability characteristics of the vessels, the height of the vessel and the characteristics of the boarding equipment, the characteristics of weapons and protective equipment, etc. Using the Becker model and the theory of discrete choice, the probability of failure of the force act is estimated. The significance of the obtained models for combating acts of force in the sea space lies in the possibility of quantitative substantiation of measures to protect the ship from pirate and terrorist attacks and deterrence measures aimed at preventing attacks (the presence of armed guards on board the ship, assistance from warships and helicopters).

The theoretical study of consensus makes it possible to analyze the various situations that social groups that make decisions in this way have to face in real life, abstracting from the specific characteristics of the groups. It is relevant for practice to study the dynamics of a social group consisting of loyal experts who, in the process of seeking consensus, yield to each other. In this case, psychological “traps” such as false consensus or groupthink are possible, which can sometimes lead to managerial decisions with dire consequences.

The article builds a mathematical consensus model for a group of loyal experts based on modeling using regular Markov chains. Analysis of the model showed that with an increase in the loyalty (decrease in authoritarianism) of group members, the time to reach consensus increases exponentially (the number of agreements increases), which is apparently due to the lack of desire among experts to take part of the responsibility for the decision being made. An increase in the size of such a group leads (ceteris paribus):

– to reduce the number of approvals to consensus in the conditions of striving for absolute loyalty of members, i. e. each additional loyal member adds less and less “strength” to the group;

– to a logarithmic increase in the number of approvals in the context of an increase in the average authoritarianism of members. It is shown that in a small group (two people), the time for reaching consensus can increase by more than 10 times compared to a group of 5 or more members), in the group there is a transfer of responsibility for making decisions.

It is proved that in the case of a group of two absolutely loyal members, consensus is unattainable.

A reasonable conclusion is made that consensus in a group of loyal experts is a special (special) case of consensus, since the dependence of the time until consensus is reached on the authoritarianism of experts and their number in the group is described by different curves than in the case of a regular group of experts.