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The traditional approach to computing optimal game strategies of firms on oligopolistic markets and of indicators of such markets consists in studying linear dynamical games with quadratic criteria and solving generalized matrix Riccati equations.

The other approach proposed by the author is based on methods of operational calculus (in particular, Z-transform). This approach makes it possible to achieve economic meaningful decisions under wider field of parameter values. It characterizes by simplicity of computations and by necessary for economic analysis visibility. One of its advantages is that in many cases important for economic practice, it, in contrast to the traditional approach, provides the ability to make calculations using widespread spreadsheets, which allows to study the prospects for the development of oligopolistic markets to a wide range of professionals and consumers.

The article deals with the practical aspects of determining the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies of participants in oligopolistic markets on the basis of operational calculus, in particular the technique of computing the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies in Excel. As an illustration of the opportinities of the proposed methods of calculation, examples close to the practical problems of forecasting indicators of the markets of high-tech products are studied.

The results of calculations obtained by the author for numerous examples and real economic systems, both using the obtained relations on the basis of spreadsheets and using extended Riccati equations, are very close. In most of the considered practical problems, the deviation of the indicators calculated in accordance with the two approaches, as a rule, does not exceed 1.5–2%. The highest value of relative deviations (up to 3–5%) is observed at the beginning of the forecasting period. In typical cases, the period of relatively noticeable deviations is 3–5 moments of time. After the transition period, there is almost complete agreement of the values of the required indicators using both approaches.

The article considers an approach to modeling the impact of sanctions and import substitution on the performance of high-tech product markets based on the use of control theory methods (operational calculus, z-transform). The model under consideration assumes that an equipment manufacturer supplies unique high-tech equipment to a high-tech product (HP) manufacturer that dominates the equipment consumer market. The HP manufacturer, fearing disruption of equipment supplies due to the introduction of all kinds of restrictions and sanctions, invests in the development of import-substituting equipment production in a third company, which can also find application in the external market, at the expense of deductions from its profits. The influence of the following factors and actions on the performance of the conditional market is analyzed: 1) the degree of inertia of the development and production development processes in the company; 2) the share of equipment of the import-substituting company supplied to the HP manufacturer; 3) sanctions (general and selective) on the supply of equipment to the company-manufacturer of the import substitution, as well as blocking the import substitution process in the third company by the first company.

The calculations show that the acceleration of the equipment development and production processes leads to a faster decrease in the production volumes of the first company. At the same time, an increase in price is observed, which is associated with a change in the parameters of the inverse demand function.

An increase in the share of equipment of the import-substituting company consumed by the second company can lead to a sharp increase in production volumes in the second and third companies, stabilization of production volumes in the first company and an increase in price.

The introduction of sanctions leads to a decrease in the production volumes and income of all companies relative to the baseline version. A significant change in price also occurs. However, due to the inertia of the equipment production processes in the example under consideration, a significant change in production volumes in the aggregate of companies occurs with a significant lag. This is especially characteristic of the third company, in which a noticeable deviation from the baseline version begins after 20 years. The blocking by the first equipment manufacturing company of investments in the development of import substitution in the third company ensures a relatively small gain for the first company in production volumes and NPV although allows to raise her market share.

The article examines the impact of non-market actions of participants in oligopolistic markets on the market structure. The following actions of one of the market participants aimed at increasing its market share are analyzed: 1) price manipulation; 2) blocking investments of stronger oligopolists; 3) destruction of produced products and capacities of competitors. Linear dynamic games with a quadratic criterion are used to model the strategies of oligopolists. The expediency of their use is due to the possibility of both an adequate description of the evolution of markets and the implementation of two mutually complementary approaches to determining the strategies of oligopolists: 1) based on the representation of models in the state space and the solution of generalized Riccati equations; 2) based on the application of operational calculus methods (in the frequency domain) which owns the visibility necessary for economic analysis.

The article shows the equivalence of approaches to solving the problem with maximin criteria of oligopolists in the state space and in the frequency domain. The results of calculations are considered in relation to a duopoly, with indicators close to one of the duopolies in the microelectronic industry of the world. The second duopolist is less effective from the standpoint of costs, though more mobile. Its goal is to increase its market share by implementing the non-market methods listed above.

Calculations carried out with help of the game model, made it possible to construct dependencies that characterize the relationship between the relative increase in production volumes over a 25-year period of weak and strong duopolists under price manipulation. Constructed dependencies show that an increase in the price for the accepted linear demand function leads to a very small increase in the production of a strong duopolist, but, simultaneously, to a significant increase in this indicator for a weak one.

Calculations carried out with use of the other variants of the model, show that blocking investments, as well as destroying the products of a strong duopolist, leads to more significant increase in the production of marketable products for a weak duopolist than to a decrease in this indicator for a strong one.