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In this study we discuss methods to solve optimal control problems based on neural network techniques. We study hierarchical dynamical two-level system for surface water quality control. The system consists of a supervisor (government) and a few agents (enterprises). We consider this problem from the point of agents. In this case we solve optimal control problem with constraints. To solve this problem, we use Pontryagin’s maximum principle, with which we obtain optimality conditions. To solve emerging ODEs, we use feedforward neural network. We provide a review of existing techniques to study such problems and a review of neural network’s training methods. To estimate the error of numerical solution, we propose to use defect analysis method, adapted for neural networks. This allows one to get quantitative error estimations of numerical solution. We provide examples of our method’s usage for solving synthetic problem and a surface water quality control model. We compare the results of this examples with known solution (when provided) and the results of shooting method. In all cases the errors, estimated by our method are of the same order as the errors compared with known solution. Moreover, we study surface water quality control problem when no solutions is provided by other methods. This happens because of relatively large time interval and/or the case of several agents. In the latter case we seek Nash equilibrium between agents. Thus, in this study we show the ability of neural networks to solve various problems including optimal control problems and differential games and we show the ability of quantitative estimation of an error. From the numerical results we conclude that the presence of the supervisor is necessary for achieving the sustainable development.

Dynamic game theoretic models of the corporative innovative development are investigated. The proposed models are based on concordance of private and public interests of agents. It is supposed that the structure of interests of each agent includes both private (personal interests) and public (interests of the whole company connected with its innovative development first) components. The agents allocate their personal resources between these two directions. The system dynamics is described by a difference (not differential) equation. The proposed model of innovative development is studied by simulation and the method of enumeration of the domains of feasible controls with a constant step. The main contribution of the paper consists in comparative analysis of efficiency of the methods of hierarchical control (compulsion or impulsion) for information structures of Stackelberg or Germeier (four structures) by means of the indices of system compatibility. The proposed model is a universal one and can be used for a scientifically grounded support of the programs of innovative development of any economic firm. The features of a specific company are considered in the process of model identification (a determination of the specific classes of model functions and numerical values of its parameters) which forms a separate complex problem and requires an analysis of the statistical data and expert estimations. The following assumptions about information rules of the hierarchical game are accepted: all players use open-loop strategies; the leader chooses and reports to the followers some values of administrative (compulsion) or economic (impulsion) control variables which can be only functions of time (Stackelberg games) or depend also on the followers’ controls (Germeier games); given the leader’s strategies all followers simultaneously and independently choose their strategies that gives a Nash equilibrium in the followers’ game. For a finite number of iterations the proposed algorithm of simulation modeling allows to build an approximate solution of the model or to conclude that it doesn’t exist. A reliability and efficiency of the proposed algorithm follow from the properties of the scenario method and the method of a direct ordered enumeration with a constant step. Some comprehensive conclusions about the comparative efficiency of methods of hierarchical control of innovations are received.

We consider one of the problems of transport modelling — searching the equilibrium distribution of traffic flows in the network. We use the classic Beckman’s model to describe time costs and flow distribution in the network represented by directed graph. Meanwhile agents’ behavior is not completely rational, what is described by the introduction of Markov logit dynamics: any driver selects a route randomly according to the Gibbs’ distribution taking into account current time costs on the edges of the graph. Thus, the problem is reduced to searching of the stationary distribution for this dynamics which is a stochastic Nash – Wardrope equilibrium in the corresponding population congestion game in the transport network. Since the game is potential, this problem is equivalent to the problem of minimization of some functional over flows distribution. The stochasticity is reflected in the appearance of the entropy regularization, in contrast to non-stochastic case. The dual problem is constructed to obtain a solution of the optimization problem. The universal primal-dual gradient method is applied. A major specificity of this method lies in an adaptive adjustment to the local smoothness of the problem, what is most important in case of the complex structure of the objective function and an inability to obtain a prior smoothness bound with acceptable accuracy. Such a situation occurs in the considered problem since the properties of the function strongly depend on the transport graph, on which we do not impose strong restrictions. The article describes the algorithm including the numerical differentiation for calculation of the objective function value and gradient. In addition, the paper represents a theoretical estimate of time complexity of the algorithm and the results of numerical experiments conducted on a small American town.

A new discrete ecological-evolutionary mathematical model is presented, in which the search mechanisms for evolutionarily stable migration routes of fish populations are implemented. The proposed adaptive designs have a small dimension, and therefore have high speed. This allows carrying out calculations on long-term perspective for an acceptable machine time. Both geometric approaches of nonlinear analysis and computer “asymptotic” methods were used in the study of stability. The migration dynamics of the fish population is described by a certain Markov matrix, which can change during evolution. The “basis” matrices are selected in the family of Markov matrices (of fixed dimension), which are used to generate migration routes of mutant. A promising direction of the evolution of the spatial behavior of fish is revealed for a given fishery and food supply, as a result of competition of the initial population with mutants. This model was applied to solve the problem of optimal catch for the long term, provided that the reservoir is divided into two parts, each of which has its own owner. Dynamic programming is used, based on the construction of the Bellman function, when solving optimization problems. A paradoxical strategy of “luring” was discovered, when one of the participants in the fishery temporarily reduces the catch in its water area. In this case, the migrating fish spends more time in this area (on condition of equal food supply). This route is evolutionarily fixes and does not change even after the resumption of fishing in the area. The second participant in the fishery can restore the status quo by applying “luring” to its part of the water area. Endless sequence of “luring” arises as a kind of game “giveaway”. A new effective concept has been introduced — the internal price of the fish population, depending on the zone of the reservoir. In fact, these prices are Bellman's private derivatives, and can be used as a tax on caught fish. In this case, the problem of long-term fishing is reduced to solving the problem of one-year optimization.

Seasonal migrations and herd instinct are traditionally recognized as wild reindeer (Rangifer tarandus L.) species-specific behavioral signs. These animals are forced to overcome water obstacles during the migrations. Behaviour peculiarities are considered as the result of the selection process, which has chosen among the sets of strategies, as the only evolutionarily stable one, determining the reproduction and biological survival of wild reindeer as a species. Natural processes in the Taimyr population wild reindeer are currently occurring against the background of an increase in the influence of negative factors due to the escalation of the industrial development of the Arctic. That is why the need to identify the ethological features of these animals completely arose. This paper presents the results of applying the classical methods of the theory of optimal control and differential games to the wild reindeer study of the migration patterns in overcoming water barriers, including major rivers. Based on these animals’ ethological features and behavior forms, the herd is presented as a controlled dynamic system, which presents also two classes of individuals: the leader and the rest of the herd, for which their models, describing the trajectories of their movement, are constructed. The models are based on hypotheses, which are the mathematical formalization of some animal behavior patterns. This approach made it possible to find the trajectory of the important one using the methods of the optimal control theory, and in constructing the trajectories of other individuals, apply the principle of control with a guide. Approbation of the obtained results, which can be used in the formation of a common “platform” for the adaptive behavior models systematic construction and as a reserve for the cognitive evolution models fundamental development, is numerically carried out using a model example with observational data on the Werchnyaya Taimyra River.

Since 1950s the field of city transport modelling has progressed rapidly. The first equilibrium distribution models of traffic flow appeared. The most popular model (which is still being widely used) was the Beckmann model, based on the two Wardrop principles. The core of the model could be briefly described as the search for the Nash equilibrium in a population demand game, in which losses of agents (drivers) are calculated based on the chosen path and demands of this path with correspondences being fixed. The demands (costs) of a path are calculated as the sum of the demands of different path segments (graph edges), that are included in the path. The costs of an edge (edge travel time) are determined by the amount of traffic on this edge (more traffic means larger travel time). The flow on a graph edge is determined by the sum of flows over all paths passing through the given edge. Thus, the cost of traveling along a path is determined not only by the choice of the path, but also by the paths other drivers have chosen. Thus, it is a standard game theory task. The way cost functions are constructed allows us to narrow the search for equilibrium to solving an optimization problem (game is potential in this case). If the cost functions are monotone and non-decreasing, the optimization problem is convex. Actually, different assumptions about the cost functions form different models. The most popular model is based on the BPR cost function. Such functions are massively used in calculations of real cities. However, in the beginning of the XXI century, Yu. E. Nesterov and A. de Palma showed that Beckmann-type models have serious weak points. Those could be fixed using the stable dynamics model, as it was called by the authors. The search for equilibrium here could be also reduced to an optimization problem, moreover, the problem of linear programming. In 2013, A.V.Gasnikov discovered that the stable dynamics model can be obtained by a passage to the limit in the Beckmann model. However, it was made only for several practically important, but still special cases. Generally, the question if this passage to the limit is possible remains open. In this paper, we provide the justification of the possibility of the above-mentioned passage to the limit in the general case, when the cost function for traveling along the edge as a function of the flow along the edge degenerates into a function equal to fixed costs until the capacity is reached and it is equal to plus infinity when the capacity is exceeded.

A dynamic game theoretic model of struggle against corruption in resource allocation is considered. It is supposed that the system of resource allocation includes one principal, one or several supervisors, and several agents. The relations between them are hierarchical: the principal influences to the supervisors, and they in turn exert influence on the agents. It is assumed that the supervisor can be corrupted. The agents propose bribes to the supervisor who in exchange allocates additional resources to them. It is also supposed that the principal is not corrupted and does not have her own purposes. The model is investigated from the point of view of the supervisor and the agents. From the point of view of agents a non-cooperative game arises with a set of Nash equilibria as a solution. The set is found analytically on the base of Pontryagin maximum principle for the specific class of model functions. From the point of view of the supervisor a hierarchical Germeyer game of the type Г_2t is built, and the respective algorithm of its solution is proposed. The punishment strategy is found analytically, and the reward strategy is built numerically on the base of a discrete analogue of the initial continuous- time model. It is supposed that all agents can change their strategies in the same time instants only a finite number of times. Thus, the supervisor can maximize his objective function of many variables instead of maximization of the objective functional. A method of qualitatively representative scenarios is used for the solution. The idea of this method consists in that it is possible to choose a very small number of scenarios among all potential ones that represent all qualitatively different trajectories of the system dynamics. These scenarios differ in principle while all other scenarios yield no essentially new results. Then a complete enumeration of the qualitatively representative scenarios becomes possible. After that, the supervisor reports to the agents the rewardpunishment control mechanism.

The model of market pricing in duopoly describing the prices dynamics as a two-dimensional map is presented. It is shown that the fixed point of the map coincides with the local Nash-equilibrium price in duopoly game. There have been numerically identified a bifurcation of the fixed point, shown the scheme of transition from periodic to chaotic mode through a doubling period. To ensure the sustainability of local Nashequilibrium price the controlling chaos mechanism has been proposed. This mechanism allows to harmonize the economic interests of the firms and to form the balanced pricing policy.

The traditional approach to computing optimal game strategies of firms on oligopolistic markets and of indicators of such markets consists in studying linear dynamical games with quadratic criteria and solving generalized matrix Riccati equations.

The other approach proposed by the author is based on methods of operational calculus (in particular, Z-transform). This approach makes it possible to achieve economic meaningful decisions under wider field of parameter values. It characterizes by simplicity of computations and by necessary for economic analysis visibility. One of its advantages is that in many cases important for economic practice, it, in contrast to the traditional approach, provides the ability to make calculations using widespread spreadsheets, which allows to study the prospects for the development of oligopolistic markets to a wide range of professionals and consumers.

The article deals with the practical aspects of determining the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies of participants in oligopolistic markets on the basis of operational calculus, in particular the technique of computing the optimal Nash–Cournot strategies in Excel. As an illustration of the opportinities of the proposed methods of calculation, examples close to the practical problems of forecasting indicators of the markets of high-tech products are studied.

The results of calculations obtained by the author for numerous examples and real economic systems, both using the obtained relations on the basis of spreadsheets and using extended Riccati equations, are very close. In most of the considered practical problems, the deviation of the indicators calculated in accordance with the two approaches, as a rule, does not exceed 1.5–2%. The highest value of relative deviations (up to 3–5%) is observed at the beginning of the forecasting period. In typical cases, the period of relatively noticeable deviations is 3–5 moments of time. After the transition period, there is almost complete agreement of the values of the required indicators using both approaches.

Protection of aquatic biological resources in the coastal area has significant features (a large number of small fishing vessels, the dynamism of the situation, the use of coastal protection), by virtue of which stands in a class of applications. A mathematical model of protection designed for the determination of detection equipment and means of violators of the situation in order to ensure the function of deterrence of illegal activities. Resolves a tactical game-theoretic problem - find the optimal line patrol (parking) means of implementation (guard boats) and optimal removal of seats from the shore fishing violators. Using the methods of the theory of experimental design, linear regression models to assess the contribution of the main factors affecting the results of the simulation.

In order to enhance the sustainability and adequacy of the model is proposed to use the mechanism of rankings means of protection, based on the borders and the rank and Pareto allows to take into account the principles of protection and further means of protection. To account for the variability of the situation offered several scenarios in which it is advisable to perform calculations.