All issues

One of the principles of forming a competitive market environment is to create conditions for economic agents to implement Nash – Cournot optimal strategies. With the standard approach to determining Nash – Cournot optimal market strategies, economic agents must have complete information about the indicators and dynamic characteristics of all market participants. Which is not true.

In this regard, to find Nash – Cournot optimal solutions in dynamic models, it is necessary to have a coordinator who has complete information about the participants. However, in the case of a large number of game participants, even if the coordinator has the necessary information, computational difficulties arise associated with the need to solve a large number of coupled equations (in the case of linear dynamic games — Riccati matrix equations).

In this regard, there is a need to decompose the general problem of determining optimal strategies for market participants into private (local) problems. Approaches based on the iterative decomposition of coupled matrix Riccati equations and the solution of local Riccati equations were studied for linear dynamic games with a quadratic criterion. This article considers a simpler approach to the iterative determination of the Nash – Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly, by decomposition using operational calculus (operator method).

The proposed approach is based on the following procedure. A virtual coordinator, which has information about the parameters of the inverse demand function, forms prices for the prospective period. Oligopolists, given fixed price dynamics, determine their strategies in accordance with a slightly modified optimality criterion. The optimal volumes of production of the oligopolists are sent to the coordinator, who, based on the iterative algorithm, adjusts the price dynamics at the previous step.

The proposed procedure is illustrated by the example of a static and dynamic model of rational behavior of oligopoly participants who maximize the net present value (NPV). Using the methods of operational calculus (and in particular, the inverse Z-transformation), conditions are found under which the iterative procedure leads to equilibrium levels of price and production volumes in the case of linear dynamic games with both quadratic and nonlinear (concave) optimization criteria.

The approach considered is used in relation to examples of duopoly, triopoly, duopoly on the market with a differentiated product, duopoly with interacting oligopolists with a linear inverse demand function. Comparison of the results of calculating the dynamics of price and production volumes of oligopolists for the considered examples based on coupled equations of the matrix Riccati equations in Matlab (in the table — Riccati), as well as in accordance with the proposed iterative method in the widely available Excel system shows their practical identity.

In addition, the application of the proposed iterative procedure is illustrated by the example of a duopoly with a nonlinear demand function.

The article examines the impact of non-market actions of participants in oligopolistic markets on the market structure. The following actions of one of the market participants aimed at increasing its market share are analyzed: 1) price manipulation; 2) blocking investments of stronger oligopolists; 3) destruction of produced products and capacities of competitors. Linear dynamic games with a quadratic criterion are used to model the strategies of oligopolists. The expediency of their use is due to the possibility of both an adequate description of the evolution of markets and the implementation of two mutually complementary approaches to determining the strategies of oligopolists: 1) based on the representation of models in the state space and the solution of generalized Riccati equations; 2) based on the application of operational calculus methods (in the frequency domain) which owns the visibility necessary for economic analysis.

The article shows the equivalence of approaches to solving the problem with maximin criteria of oligopolists in the state space and in the frequency domain. The results of calculations are considered in relation to a duopoly, with indicators close to one of the duopolies in the microelectronic industry of the world. The second duopolist is less effective from the standpoint of costs, though more mobile. Its goal is to increase its market share by implementing the non-market methods listed above.

Calculations carried out with help of the game model, made it possible to construct dependencies that characterize the relationship between the relative increase in production volumes over a 25-year period of weak and strong duopolists under price manipulation. Constructed dependencies show that an increase in the price for the accepted linear demand function leads to a very small increase in the production of a strong duopolist, but, simultaneously, to a significant increase in this indicator for a weak one.

Calculations carried out with use of the other variants of the model, show that blocking investments, as well as destroying the products of a strong duopolist, leads to more significant increase in the production of marketable products for a weak duopolist than to a decrease in this indicator for a strong one.

In the first part of the paper we present convergence analysis of AGMsDR method on a new class of functions — in general non-convex with $M$-Lipschitz-continuous gradients that satisfy Polyak – Lojasiewicz condition. Method does not need the value of $\mu^{PL}>0$ in the condition and converges linearly with a scale factor $\left(1 - \frac{\mu^{PL}}{M}\right)$. It was previously proved that method converges as $O\left(\frac1{k^2}\right)$ if a function is convex and has $M$-Lipschitz-continuous gradient and converges linearly with a~scale factor $\left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{\mu^{SC}}{M}}\right)$ if the value of strong convexity parameter $\mu^{SC}>0$ is known. The novelty is that one can save linear convergence if $\frac{\mu^{PL}}{\mu^{SC}}$ is not known, but without square root in the scale factor.

The second part presents modification of AGMsDR method for solving problems that allow alternating minimization (Alternating AGMsDR). The similar results are proved.

As the result, we present adaptive accelerated methods that converge as $O\left(\min\left\lbrace\frac{M}{k^2},\,\left(1-{\frac{\mu^{PL}}{M}}\right)^{(k-1)}\right\rbrace\right)$ on a class of convex functions with $M$-Lipschitz-continuous gradient that satisfy Polyak – Lojasiewicz condition. Algorithms do not need values of $M$ and $\mu^{PL}$. If Polyak – Lojasiewicz condition does not hold, the convergence is $O\left(\frac1{k^2}\right)$, but no tuning needed.

We also consider the adaptive catalyst envelope of non-accelerated gradient methods. The envelope allows acceleration up to $O\left(\frac1{k^2}\right)$. We present numerical comparison of non-accelerated adaptive gradient descent which is accelerated using adaptive catalyst envelope with AGMsDR, Alternating AGMsDR, APDAGD (Adaptive Primal-Dual Accelerated Gradient Descent) and Sinkhorn's algorithm on the problem dual to the optimal transport problem.

Conducted experiments show faster convergence of alternating AGMsDR in comparison with described catalyst approach and AGMsDR, despite the same asymptotic rate $O\left(\frac1{k^2}\right)$. Such behavior can be explained by linear convergence of AGMsDR method and was tested on quadratic functions. Alternating AGMsDR demonstrated better performance in comparison with AGMsDR.

We propose a family of Gauss –Newton methods for solving optimization problems and systems of nonlinear equations based on the ideas of using the upper estimate of the norm of the residual of the system of nonlinear equations and quadratic regularization. The paper presents a development of the «Three Squares Method» scheme with the addition of a momentum term to the update rule of the sought parameters in the problem to be solved. The resulting scheme has several remarkable properties. First, the paper algorithmically describes a whole parametric family of methods that minimize functionals of a special kind: compositions of the residual of a nonlinear equation and an unimodal functional. Such a functional, entirely consistent with the «gray box» paradigm in the problem description, combines a large number of solvable problems related to applications in machine learning, with the regression problems. Secondly, the obtained family of methods is described as a generalization of several forms of the Levenberg –Marquardt algorithm, allowing implementation in non-Euclidean spaces as well. The algorithm describing the parametric family of Gauss –Newton methods uses an iterative procedure that performs an inexact parametrized proximal mapping and shift using a momentum term. The paper contains a detailed analysis of the efficiency of the proposed family of Gauss – Newton methods; the derived estimates take into account the number of external iterations of the algorithm for solving the main problem, the accuracy and computational complexity of the local model representation and oracle computation. Sublinear and linear convergence conditions based on the Polak – Lojasiewicz inequality are derived for the family of methods. In both observed convergence regimes, the Lipschitz property of the residual of the nonlinear system of equations is locally assumed. In addition to the theoretical analysis of the scheme, the paper studies the issues of its practical implementation. In particular, in the experiments conducted for the suboptimal step, the schemes of effective calculation of the approximation of the best step are given, which makes it possible to improve the convergence of the method in practice in comparison with the original «Three Square Method». The proposed scheme combines several existing and frequently used in practice modifications of the Gauss –Newton method, in addition, the paper proposes a monotone momentum modification of the family of developed methods, which does not slow down the search for a solution in the worst case and demonstrates in practice an improvement in the convergence of the method.